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RISK AND RESPONSE IN FRACTURING
POLICY
HANNAH J. WISEMAN
An oil and gas extraction technique called hydraulic
fracturing (also called fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking)
has swept the country and has raised the stakes of the energy
policy debate. As operators drill thousands of new wells and
inject water and chemicals down these wells in order to
fracture underground shale and tight sandstone formations,
concerned citizens’ groups and the media have pointed to
flaming tap water and have worried about chemical
contamination; at the same time, industry representatives
and many state regulators have sworn that the practice has
never contaminated groundwater. The outpouring of
attention to injection—just one stage of a complex well
development process—threatens to distract from the core
issues of “tight” oil and gas development and to leave the
most pressing concerns unaddressed. Through a comparison
of regulation and alleged violations of environmental and oil
and gas laws at hydraulically fractured well sites, this
Article illuminates the factors that must inform policy and
regulatory changes that guide modern oil and gas
development. The examples of violations so far suggest that
the most pressing risks may predominantly arise not from
the injection of chemicals and water but from other stages of
the well development process introduced by fracturing and
from the higher rate of well drilling spurred by fracturing.
This does not suggest that fracturing itself poses no risks.
 Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. J.D., Yale Law
School; A.B., Dartmouth College. Many thanks to Professor Alexandra Klass for
her comments on this paper, to Professors Bruce Kramer and Patrick McGinley
for their comments on two of my research papers to which this article frequently
cites, and to Chad Davis, Joel Daniel, Francis Gradijan, Nikki Pasrija, Matthew
Peña, Jeremy Schepers, and Molly Wurzer of the University of Texas College of
Law for their extremely valuable research efforts. The Energy Institute of the
University of Texas funded research that is referenced in portions of this Article.
After completing the research funded by the Energy Institute, I learned that a
lead professor of the research project was a member of the board of a gas company
that conducts hydraulic fracturing and had a major financial stake in that
company. I was unaware of this conflict when I completed the research, and the
professor was not an author of either of the papers that I completed for the
Energy Institute.
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Rather, we must recognize the new risks introduced by
several non-injection stages essential to the fracturing
process, as well as by the drilling enabled by fracturing, and
shift our attention to the most problematic stages. Chemicals
may spill when transported to well sites, and new types of
wastes must be stored and disposed of. Furthermore,
methane may contaminate underground water sources
during the drilling process preceding fracturing. If
policymakers and regulators allow drilling and fracturing to
continue at their current frenzied pace, it is imperative that
they change course to recognize and respond to these core
risks. The analysis in this Article offers an initial path
forward.
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INTRODUCTION
A once obscure oil and gas extraction technique has
transformed the American economy1 and introduced one of the
greatest policy and regulatory challenges of recent times.
Hydraulic fracturing (or fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking)
has triggered fossil fuel production from areas once thought
inaccessible or economically inefficient to utilize,2 and it has
led the United States toward the status of fuel exporter.3 In
particular, the practice of “slickwater” or “slick water”
fracturing,4 developed in the late 1990s,5 has recently spurred
the development of thousands of new wells6 in shales, tight
1. The United States may soon be a net exporter of oil and gas. See INTL.
ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 at 74 (2012) (not accessible by
the public without payment; on file with author).
2. See, e.g., HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS 1 (2008), http://
www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf
(noting that “one of the first recognized major shale gas plays, the Barnett Shale
of Texas, was under investigation as early as 1981, but not until 1995 was the
hydraulic fracturing technology available that successfully brought in the gas at
commercial rates”).
3. See INTL. ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 1; see also Fred Hagemeyer,
Production and Marketing of Hydrocarbons in the U.S.—A Survey of Recent
Trends and Development, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: MIDSTREAM AND
MARKETING, at 1-1, (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found, Min. L. Series, Vol. 2011 No. 1)
(observing that “[f]ive years ago, conventional wisdom suggested that the U.S.
hydrocarbon resource base was peaking and poised for a long-term decline” but
that this wisdom has changed due largely to the production of unconventional oil
from the Bakken Shale and to a boom in natural gas production from shales in
several regions).
4. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (Jan. 24, 2011),
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse_barnettshale.php
(describing
fracturing of shale—the pumping of large volumes of water and some chemicals
down the well—as slick water fracturing).
5. See David F. Martineau, Expansion of the Barnett Shale Play Fort Worth
Basin—Texas, in DEVELOPMENT ISSUES & CONFLICTS IN MODERN GAS & OIL
PLAYS, at 5-13 (Rocky Mountain. Min. L. Found., Min. L. Series, Vol. 2004 No. 4)
(“In 1997, Mitchell [Energy] changed the frac method to a ‘slick water frac’ or
‘light sand frac.’”).
6. See What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (July 12, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm
(explaining that without horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, “natural gas
does not flow to the well rapidly, and commercial quantities cannot be produced
from shale”); see also Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil & Gas Mgmt.,
2010 Total Wells Drilled (last updated Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.dep.state.pa.us/
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/photogallery/photo13295/2010%20%20Wells%20Drille
d.gif (showing 1,386 Marcellus wells drilled in 2010) [hereinafter Pennsylvania
2010 Total Wells Drilled]; R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK, EAST (BARNETT SHALE)
FIELD
[hereinafter
NEWARK,
EAST
(BARNETT
SHALE)
FIELD],
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/fielddata/barnettshale.pdf (“As of October 09, 2012
there are 16,346 total gas wells entered on RRC records” and an additional 2,532
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sandstones (“tight sands”), and coalbeds—called “tight”
formations because of their low permeability.7 International
energy companies have rushed to the United States to better
understand the technique and transport it to their own fossil
fuel reserves,8 and once-sleepy communities have benefited
from suddenly-valuable mineral rights and an infusion of new
jobs.9 At the same time, these communities have struggled to
address road damage,10 social and economic change,11 and

“permitted locations.”).
7. Stephen A. Holditch, Tight Gas Sands, 58 J. PETROL. TECH. 86 (2006),
http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/2006/06/JPT2006_06_DA_series.pdf
(describing tight gas formations as “low-permeability reservoirs that produce
mainly dry natural gas,” including “carbonates, shales, and coal seams”); see also
Hong Sun et al., A Nondamaging Friction Reducer for Slickwater Frac
Applications, SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, no. 139480, 2011 at 1 (article purchased
by and on file with author) (describing slickwater fracturing jobs in shales and
tight sandstone formations). This Article does not address coalbed methane
development.
8. See, e.g., Ed Crooks et al., China and France Chase U.S. Shale Assets,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012, 7:30 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl
/cms/s/0/30c4c46e-35e2-11e1-9f9800144feabdc0.html#axzz2D5RjYdg0 (describing
foreign investment in U.S. shale gas and oil and China’s “hopes that techniques
pioneered in the U.S. could be used to develop China’s own resources”).
9. See TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS
SHALE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA 19,
(July 14, 2010), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/APIEconomic
-Impacts-Marcellus-Shale.ashx (concluding in a report prepared for the American
Petroleum Institute that “[t]he Marcellus gas industry in Pennsylvania provides a
direct economic stimulus of $3.77 billion gross sales to the local economy” and
encourages spending that “adds another $1.56 billion to total state gross output”
and that the total economic impact in West Virginia in 2009 was $939 million).
10. See MARK MURAWSKI, TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS AND IMPACTS FROM
MARCELLUS DEVELOPMENT (May 24, 2012), http://planningpa.org/wpcontent/uploads/ Marcellus_Transpo_Impacts_5-24-12.pdf (showing pictures of
road damage, and noting that “[f]or the most part, gas companies are doing a good
job making necessary repairs to local roads” but that “[f]uture road maintenance
may be a concern,” as well as “[a]ccelerated deterioration to life cycle
pavements.”); SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, WHITE PAPER ON SPE SUMMIT ON
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1, 5–6 (2011) (noting that “[h]eavy truck traffic on local
roadways contributes to noise, congestion, and the potential for vehicle
accidents”).
11. See, e.g., JONATHAN WILLIAMSON & BONITA KOLB, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
CMTY. & THE ECON., LYCOMING COLLEGE, MARCELLUS NATURAL GAS
DEVELOPMENT’S EFFECT ON HOUSING IN PENNSYLVANIA 4–5 (Oct. 2011),
http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/resources/PDFs/housingreport.pdf (concluding that
“[s]ignificant variation exists in each community’s ability to absorb demand for
additional housing” but that some areas are experiencing shortages, and that
impacts fall most heavily on residents “on the economic margins”); SOC’Y OF
PETROL. ENG’RS, supra note 10, at 5 (“Numerous industry out-of-town workers
contribute to the local economy, but may drive prices higher and change the
sociological dynamics of small communities.”).
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environmental effects.12
This rapid energy transition, which has created both
powerful benefits and challenges, has deeply divided the
country. Industry representatives and many state regulators
argue that oil and gas operators13 have used hydraulic
fracturing for more than half a century without any notable
damage to the environment or human health,14 while the
media has broadcast images of homeowners lighting their tap
water on fire.15 Environmental groups have split, with some
tepidly supporting the development of a cleaner fossil fuel
(natural gas) through fracturing16 and others expressing deep
concerns about extraction effects.17 New York temporarily
halted most fracturing that uses large volumes of water and
sued the federal government in search of stricter controls.18
12. See infra Part II for a discussion of state enforcement of environmental
regulations at well sites, which shows some of the environmental effects that have
occurred.
13. In the oil and gas context, the entity that drills the well is typically
referred to as the operator. See JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
OIL AND GAS LAW 31 n.12 (5th ed. 2008).
14. See, e.g., Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the
Marcellus Shale, in DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE MAJOR SHALE PLAYS, at 2-24,
(Rocky Mountain. Min. L. Found., Min. L. Series, Vol. 2010 No. 5) (describing
fracturing as “safe and proven . . . in its 60-year history”); Kevin Fisher,
Halliburton, Frac Facts: Data Confirm Safety of Well Fracturing, AM. OIL & GAS
REPORTER, June 14, 2011, http://www.aogr.com/index.php/magazine/frac-facts
(“In the more than [sixty] years following . . . [the] first treatments, more than
[two] million frac treatments have been pumped with no documented case of any
treatment polluting an aquifer.”); infra text accompanying notes 40–48 (describing
statements by many state regulators).
15. Davidmholmes, My Water’s on Fire Tonight (The Fracking Song),
YOUTUBE (May 10, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= timfvNgr_Q4&
noredirect=1; GASLAND (Joshua Fox 2010) (showing flaming tapwater).
16. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, THREE KEY ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF NATURAL GAS
DEVELOPMENT 1 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/
environmental-risks-of-natural-gas-development_0.pdf (noting that “[n]atural gas
is a resurgent part of the energy mix” but identifying risks in well construction,
air emissions, and wastewater disposal).
17. See generally, e.g., LISA SUMI, OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
OUR DRINKING WATER AT RISK (Apr. 2005), http://www.earthworksaction.org/
files/publications/DrinkingWaterAtRisk.pdf (arguing that fracturing contaminates
water and has a range of other negative impacts); Amy Mall, Incidents Where
Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of Drinking Water Contamination,
SWITCHBOARD: NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/ incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html.
18. SGEIS on the Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, N.Y.
STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/47554.html
(explaining that when the Department completes the environmental impact
statement, it “will then process and, as appropriate, issue well permits for gas
well development using high-volume hydraulic fracturing”) (last visited Nov. 23,

2013]

RISK AND RESPONSE

735

Neighboring Pennsylvania, in contrast, allowed the number of
fractured wells to increase more than 300 percent between
2008 and 2009,19 and again by 180 percent from 2009 to 2010.20
The state began to update its environmental regulations as
well development rushed forward.21 Energy companies in
Arkansas,22 Colorado,23 Louisiana,24 Michigan,25 North
2012); New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012 WL 4336701 at *1, *10–
13 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the lawsuit against the Corps and other federal
parties that allegedly should have conducted a full environmental review of
proposed regulations of the Delaware River Basin Commission before finalizing
the regulations, and dismissing the suit on standing grounds, but stating that
New York could likely sue when the challenged regulations had been finalized).
19. Ford Turner, State-Issued Marcellus Shale Gas Well Drilling Permits
Increase 300% in 2009, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009, 11:28 AM), available at
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/11/stateissued_marcellus_shale_
g.html; see also Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas Mgmt., 2008
Total Wells Drilled (Dec. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Pennsylvania 2008 Total Wells
Drilled], http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Web
site%20Pictures/2008/2008%20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (showing 195 Marcellus Shale
wells drilled in 2008); Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas Mgmt.,
2009 Total Wells Drilled (Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Pennsylvania 2009 Total
Wells Drilled], http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%2
0Website%20Pictures/2009/2009%20%20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (showing 768 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 2009).
20. See Pennsylvania 2009 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 19 (showing 768
Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 2009); Pennsylvania 2010 Total Wells Drilled,
supra note 6 (showing 1,386 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 2010).
21. H.RB. 1950, 2011–2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) Pa. Gen.
Assembly (2011) (signed); Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Water Standards and
Facility Regulation, Doc. 385-2100-002, Nov. 12, 2011, http://www.elibrary.dep.
state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-85967/385-2100-002%20tech%20guidance.pdf
(describing new wastewater treatment requirements); 25 Pa. Bull. 78 (Feb. 5,
2011), available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol41/41-6/239.html
(showing updates to casing and cementing requirements).
22. See Ark. Geological Survey, General Information, http://www.geology.
ar.gov/energy/natural_gas.htm (noting that “[a]pproximately 2.5 million acres
have been leased in the Fayetteville Shale gas play” and providing production
numbers).
23. Natural Gas Drilling: Public Health and Environmental Impacts: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Neslin Testimony] (testimony of David Neslin, Dir., Colo, Oil and Gas Conserv.
Comm’n), http://cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_Topics/Hydraulic_Fractur
ing/Director_Neslin_Senate_Testimony_041211.pdf (explaining that most of
Colorado’s 44,000 active gas wells are hydraulically fractured).
24. La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Haynesville Shale Gas Play Well Activity Map,
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/haynesville_shale/haynesville_20111027.pdf
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (showing 1,591 producing wells in the Haynesville
Shale).
25. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Dep’t of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs,
About Michigan’s Natural Gas Industry: Exploration and Production,
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/mpsc/gas/about1.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011)
(describing approximately 9,700 wells producing gas in the Antrim Shale in 2010,
but explaining that production peaked in 1993).
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Dakota,26 Texas,27 and many other states have similarly forged
ahead with drilling and fracturing.
While this rush of activity continues, the debate has
tended to focus on whether or not the injection of water and
chemicals underground—the only stage of the process that is
technically described as “fracturing”28—pollutes groundwater.29
Yet injection represents only a small part of a multi-stage well
development process,30 and this narrow focus is unproductive.
Fracking would not occur without many other essential well
development steps, including constructing a well pad and
access road, drilling and casing (lining) a well, and storing and
disposing of drilling and fracturing wastes, among many other
steps.31 Investigating the more complete life cycle of a drilled
and fractured well reveals certain risks that have received
insufficient attention, such as potential surface or underground
water contamination from chemical spills and improper waste
storage and disposal, methane contamination of underground
water supplies from drilling that precedes fracturing, and
higher quantities of water use.32
26. AM. PETROL. INST., STRATEGIC ENERGY RESOURCES: BAKKEN SHALE,
NORTH DAKOTA
(Winter
2008),
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/
Exploration/Energy-Resources/StrategicEnergyResources-BakkenShale.pdf
(describing how hydraulic fracturing has enabled production from the Bakken and
noting that there are “nearly 4,000 active oil wells in North Dakota”).
27. See NEWARK, EAST (BARNETT SHALE) FIELD, supra note 6.
28. See Jennifer L. Miskimins, Jeff Johnson & Mark Turner, The Technical
Aspects of Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND, no. 5, 2011, at 1-2
(describing fracturing as including injection of a fluid “pad,” followed by slurry
injection of water and proppants (such as sand) to prop open fractures and allow
gas to flow, a stage that allows the fractures to close back around the proppant,
and flow back of the fracturing fluids).
29. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (describing congressionallymandated EPA studies and nonprofit documents addressing potential
groundwater contamination).
30. For sources describing the many stages of the well development and
fracturing process, see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT:
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS,
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 5-6 to -143 (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (describing stages from land
disturbance to build access roads and well pads through well plugging); HANNAH
WISEMAN & FRANCIS GRADIJAN, REGULATION OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT,
INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 9–14 (Jan. 2012), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547
(research
funded
by
the
University of Texas Energy Institute).
31. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 30, at 5-6 to -14, 524 to -37, 5-118 to -134.
32. As explained, infra, Part I.A., describing the risks of tight oil and gas well
development with slickwater fracturing is difficult in terms of defining the
baselines from which comparison should occur and in defining “risk” itself.
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This Article proposes to reframe the debate. In light of the
states’ core regulatory responsibility for controlling risk in this
area, it reviews state agency enforcement activity at well sites
to suggest an alternative understanding of the core risks of the
well development process—which include fracturing and many
other stages—and to provide a framework for effective dialogue
moving forward. In investigating each potential risk, it
describes how local, state, regional, and federal regulations and
enforcement of these regulations have, in some cases, failed to
adequately respond to the risks. Although the degree and
geographic reach of the risks remains an open question
requiring further, detailed study,33 the focus in regulation and
policy must immediately shift to these areas. Reviewing the
environmental violations to date, existing regulatory
structures, and the nascent scientific literature enables an
important early understanding of how this focus must shift.
Part I describes the tendency of policymakers and
regulators to focus on injection of water and chemicals down
wells, which distracts from other potential risks. Part II
introduces the methodology underlying this Article’s
preliminary identification of broader risks—beyond injection—
and the adequacy of regulatory response. Part III then explores
the potential risks of fracturing from a regulatory perspective
and describes the regulatory responses to date, briefly
suggesting how they may need to change. It looks to the new
activities that fracturing introduces to the well-development
process, the increase in oil and gas drilling enabled by
fracturing, the violations of state environmental and oil and
gas laws that have accompanied these activities, and
preliminary analyses of risk by scientists and state agencies.
After each core potential risk is identified, Part III also
describes the regulatory responses to these risks thus far.
Finally, Part IV begins to explore how these responses may

33. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-732,
INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS 4 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647791.pdf
(concluding that “[t]he risks identified in the studies and publications we reviewed
cannot, at present, be quantified”); Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane
Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic
Fracturing, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATL. ACAD. OF SCI. (May 9, 2011), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/02/1100682108.full.pdf+html (describing potential causes of methane contamination in groundwater wells in
Pennsylvania near Marcellus wells but concluding that further research is needed
to fully identify the pathways).
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need to change and, very briefly, at what level of governance
the changes may need to occur.
Drilling and hydraulic fracturing of unconventional wells
will likely continue to be a common technique within oil and
gas development through the foreseeable future. Regulatory
agencies cannot afford to ignore the risks of fracturing and the
many well-development stages that both precede and follow it.
The practice is so economically important in part because it can
be profitably employed across large swaths of the United
States, including highly populated areas.34 For the same
reason, the potential for environmental harm is not limited to a
few isolated regions of the country. Crafting regulations that
will allow industry, states, and communities to reap the
benefits of enhanced natural gas extraction while minimizing
the potential for environmental damage is, therefore, crucially
important.
I.

THE NARROW FOCUS ON FRACTURING (INJECTION) AND
GROUNDWATER

As policymakers, agencies, scientists, industrial actors,
and citizens’ groups spar over the risks of tight oil and gas
development and needed regulatory change, the focus on the
injection portion of the development process is pervasive.
Questions of whether fracturing will pollute underground
water sources dominate the only complete Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) study that has addressed
fracturing—a controversial 2004 report that concluded that
contamination was not a concern and that further study was
unnecessary.35 A second, in-progress study of fracturing in
shales also prioritizes concerns about drinking water
contamination from fracturing because a House of
Representatives Committee proposed this focus,36 although the
34. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth, Gas Wells, Applications and Permits,
http://fortworthtexas.gov/gaswells/default.aspx?id=50608 (showing 1,483 gas wells
in Fort Worth, Texas, which include “pre-existing” wells, and showing an
additional 526 permitted wells in the city).
35. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS
TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF
COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 7–5 (2004), available at water.epa.gov/type/
groundwater/ uic/upload/completestudy.zip.
36. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SCOPING MATERIALS FOR INITIAL DESIGN OF
EPA RESEARCH STUDY ON POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING AND DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 2 (2010), http://yosemite.epa
.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/3B745430D624ED3B852576D400514B76/$File/Hydrauli
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EPA has promised to address broader questions, such as
surface water use and the risks of surface spills.37 The Oil and
Gas Accountability Project of Earthworks similarly highlights
water contamination concerns,38 and the Natural Resources
Defense Council maintains a running list of potential
groundwater contamination incidents linked to drilling and
fracturing.39
Responding to these concerns, many state officials, too,
have focused their efforts on proving that injection (fracturing)
is safe and has not polluted groundwater. On May 11, 2011, the
Chairman of Texas’s oil and gas regulatory agency testified
before Congress that “not once has Texas experienced a case of
groundwater contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing”
and asserted that she did “not know of a single reported case of
contamination nationwide.”40 The Colorado Oil and Gas
Commissioner similarly noted that most of Colorado’s wells are
hydraulically fractured and that the agency has “found no
verified instance of hydraulic fracturing harming groundwater.”41 State regulators also have split hairs over allegations
of groundwater contamination in written statements prepared
for the Ground Water Protection Council (a nonprofit
association of state regulators that opposes certain federal
regulation of fracturing42), admitting that some water had been
c+Frac+Scoping+Doc+for+SAB-3-22-10+Final.pdf (describing the budget report of
the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriation Conference Committee that
urged “the Agency to carry out a study on the relationship between hydraulic
fracturing and drinking water”); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-11/122,
PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, at ix (2011), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/
HF_Study__Plan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA
601/R-12/011, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT (2012), http://www.epa.
gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf (showing initial results of the study in a
progress report).
37. See supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., SUMI, supra note 17.
39. Mall, supra note 17.
40. Review of Hydraulic Fracturing Technology: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Sci., Space, and Tech., 112th Cong. 1 (May 11, 2011) (testimony of Elizabeth
Ames Jones, Chairman, R.R. Comm’n of Tex.), http://science.house.gov/sites/r
epublicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%
20Written%20Testimony-Final-5-9-2011%20jones.pdf.
41. Neslin Testimony, supra note 23.
42. Hearing Before H. Comm. on Natural Res. & Subcomm. on Energy and
Mineral Res., 110th Cong. 2–3 (June 4, 2009) (statement of Scott Kell, President,
Ground Water Prot. Council), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/
ogsgeisapp2.pdf (arguing that “state regulations are designed to provide the level
of water protection needed to assure water resources remain both viable and
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polluted and some homes had exploded43 but that these were
the result of poor well casing or cementing jobs, “operator
negligence,”44 the use of pits to store wastes,45 or other events
unrelated to hydraulic fracturing. These regulators concluded
that “no groundwater pollution or disruption of underground
sources of drinking water has been attributed to hydraulic
fracturing of deep gas formations,”46 that they had “not
documented a single incident involving contamination of
groundwater attributed to hydraulic fracturing,”47 that they
had “found no example of contamination of usable water where
the cause was claimed to be hydraulic fracturing,”48 and that
not one water contamination case “was caused by hydraulic
fracturing activity.”49 Environmental groups, in turn, have
argued that these regulators too thinly parse the definition of
hydraulic fracturing and that the practice has in fact caused
water contamination.50
available” and that “[a] one-size-fits-all federal program is not the most effective
way to regulate in this area”).
43. Letter from Scott R. Kell, Deputy Chief, Div. of Mineral Res. Mgmt.
(Ohio), to Mike Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 27, 2009)
[hereinafter Kell Letter], http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/
ogsgeisapp2.pdf (noting that natural gas migration into aquifers and a resulting
home explosion, which “significantly damaged one house,” were caused by
ineffective well casing, not fracturing).
44. Letter from Joseph J. Lee, Jr., Chief, Source Prot. Section, Div. of Water
Use Planning, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to Michael Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground
Water Prot. Council (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Lee Letter], http://www.dec.
ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2.pdf.
45. Letter from Mark E. Fesmire, PE, Dir., N.M. Oil Conserv. Div., to Michael
Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter
Fesmire Letter], http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2
.pdf (“While we do currently list approximately 421 ground water contamination
cases caused by pits and approximately an equal number caused by other
contamination mechanisms, we have found no example of contamination of usable
water where the cause was claimed to be hydraulic fracturing.”).
46. Lee Letter, supra note 44.
47. Kell Letter, supra note 43.
48. Fesmire Letter, supra note 45.
49. Letter from Victor G. Carillo, Chairman, R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., to Michael
Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 29, 2009),
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2.pdf.
50. See, e.g., Mall, supra note 17 (arguing that “incidents of drinking water
contamination where hydraulic fracturing is considered as a suspected cause have
not been sufficiently investigated”); Mike Soraghan, Baffled About Fracking?
You’re Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2011/05/13/13greenwire-baffled-about-fracking-youre-not-alone-44383.html?
pagewanted=all (quoting Josh Fox, director of the Gasland documentary: “When
they [industry officials] confine their definition to the single moment of the
underground fracturing—a part of the process that has never been investigated—
they can legally deny the obvious,” but noting that methane contamination likely
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Despite regulators’ assurances that fracturing is safe,
groundwater contamination concerns associated with injection
are important issues that must not be ignored as fracturing
rapidly expands. Indeed, one incident in Wyoming in a
relatively shallow shale51 suggests that injection may
potentially have contributed to water contamination, although
investigations of the cause of contamination continue and are
hotly debated.52 Despite the need to continue to study the risk
of underground contamination from injection, the short history
of widespread shale gas development suggests that other risks
may be far more important. The following Part discusses my
attempts to identify the risks to be prioritized and various
governments’ efforts to respond to these risks.
II. METHODS OF IDENTIFYING RISK AND RESPONSE
Any effort to identify the core environmental risks of shale
gas development and to measure the adequacy of regulatory
response is itself fraught with risk. Oil and gas drilling is a
highly technical field that employs sophisticated technologies,
and the industry has the most extensive and accurate
knowledge of the field’s intricacies. Further, the business is not
comprised of one cohesive group, thus complicating the picture
even more: certain firms have detailed knowledge about
formulating fracturing chemicals, others conduct well drilling,
and still others employ experienced engineers to guide the
several stages of well perforation and injection for fracturing.53
These knowledgeable industry actors likely have incentives to
reveal only a fraction of this information, both to protect
individual firm competitiveness and, in some cases, perhaps to
downplay the risks.54 Indeed, the EPA has, in some cases, had
has been caused by drilling, not fracturing).
51. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600/R-00/000, DRAFT,
INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING
(2011), http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOnPavilli
on_Dec-8-2011.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Chesapeake Disputes EPA’s Report on Pavilion,
Wyo., NATL. PUB. RADIO, Dec. 12, 2011, available at http://state
impact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/12/12/chesapeake-official-disputes-epas-reporton-pavilion-wyo/.
53. See, e.g., Production Enhancement, HALLIBURTON, http://www.halliburton.
com/careers/ default.aspx?pageid=4312&navid=2013 (last visited Dec. 4, 2012)
(“Production Enhancement Field Engineers oversee and execute stimulation
designs and techniques . . . .”).
54. See, e.g., Katie Howell, More Oversight Sought for Hydraulic Fracturing,
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to use formal requests—even subpoenas—to collect information
about the chemicals used in fracturing and wastewater
disposal practices associated with fractured wells.55
Risks also are not stagnant. As technologies and practices
evolve, so too do the associated environmental concerns.
Technologies associated with fracturing change quickly, with
new experimental technologies for on-site waste treatment and
wastewater recycling emerging daily.56 Finally, because
slickwater fracturing has only recently become a dominant
practice in oil and gas, the available literature on fracturing
risk is sparse.
This Part takes one step toward identifying risks through
a methodology based in state administrative law: it proposes
that we can paint an initial picture of risk and thus frame a
policy debate by looking both to the existing literature and to
violations of state oil and gas and environmental laws at oil
and gas sites—particularly those with fracturing operations.
This provides a concrete, albeit incomplete, view of the likely
effects of drilling and fracturing, and thus, the areas that state
agencies should prioritize. Section A below describes how this
Article employs the term “risk” and the types of data collected
to begin to identify this risk, including the limitations of these
data. Section B introduces the literature and regulatory
sources that show how governments have begun to respond to
the effects of shale gas development.

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/11/
04/04greenwire-more-oversight-sought-for-hydraulic-fracturing-35961.html?page
wanted=all (noting that “[i]n the past, companies have been loath to disclose the
components of fracturing fluids,” although more companies now support
disclosure). Cf., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling
Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1412
(2008) (“Industries generally hold an advantage over regulators with respect to
their understanding of the production processes and pollution-control technologies
available to them, but arguably have a disincentive to share that information with
regulatory agencies that might use it as a basis for regulation.”).
55. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUBPOENA AND INFORMATION REQUEST
(HALLIBURTON) (Nov. 9, 2010), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/
class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hydrofrac_halliburton_subpoena_11-9-2010.pdf;
Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information from
Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal, (May
12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/4816775AD0E
881AB8525788E006A91ED.
56. See, e.g., CleanSuite™ Technologies, HALLIBURTON, http://www.hallibur
ton.com/public/projects/pubsdata/hydraulic_fracturing/CleanSuite_Technologies.h
tml (last visited Dec. 4, 2012) (describing treatment technologies).
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Understanding the Risks: Definitions and Methodology

This Article employs a broad definition of risk, describing
the potential for an activity to introduce pollutants to any
environmental medium, including air, water (surface or
underground), or soil, as an environmental risk.57 Other
methodologies define risk more narrowly. To use contamination
of environmental resources as one example, a recent study of
groundwater contamination risks posed by fracturing defines
contamination only as including “anything that could
potentially exceed the limits of the U.S. Clean Water Act or
Safe Drinking Water Act.”58 In contrast, this Article describes
many incidents of pollutant releases from wells or disposal
sites and associated contamination of soil, surface water, or
groundwater, as posing potential risks; it does so even when
information about the incident does not show whether or not
the contamination exceeded environmental standards. This
Article uses this broader definition only to demonstrate the
potential for serious incidents that cause exceedances of
standards to occur.
In defining risk, questions about baselines also emerge: Do
we define risks as compared to a baseline of zero pollution, or
simply to previous practices? This Article sets a baseline in the
mid-1990s—a time before which slickwater fracturing of
horizontal wells in shales and tight sands became common.59
The Article therefore somewhat artificially draws a line
separating new oil and gas practices from old ones. Broadly
57. This follows definitions from the literature and cases. See Talbot R. Page,
A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 207
n.1 (1978) (“‘Risk’ has several distinct meanings depending on its usage. In
‘environmental risk,’ the term draws attention to the potential adverse
consequences, for which the underlying probability may be highly uncertain.”);
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (defining a risk as
“exposure to the chance of injury or loss,” including, for example, in the oil spill
context, “both the likelihood of a spill and the amount of damage the spill would
inflict”).
58. Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated
with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382,
1384 (2011), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01757.x/
pdf.
59. See Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (“In 1997, the first slick
water frac (or light sand frac) was performed and found to be very successful in
stimulating the Barnett Shale.”); Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Drilling For Natural
Gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGMPortalFiles/MarcellusShale/Marc
ellusFAQ.pdf (noting the use of horizontal drilling) [hereinafter Marcellus Shale
Formation FAQ].

744

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

speaking, “old” oil and gas practices often involved
conventional oil and gas wells and vertical unconventional
wells (drilled straight down into a formation) that were
fractured with gels.60 To fracture a well with gels, an operator,
after drilling a well, would inject large quantities of gel-like
substances down wells. These substances fractured the
formation around the well and released oil or gas; the gels then
carried large quantities of proppants (sand) into the formations
to prop open fractures and allow the released oil or gas to
flow.61
The Article assumes that new oil and gas practices involve
more horizontal wells (drilled straight down and then laterally
underground)62 and slickwater fracturing in shales and tight
sandstone formations; it ignores production from coalbeds,
which uses somewhat different technologies and presents
different risks.63 The slickwater fracturing technique applied to
shales and tight sands uses different chemicals than did gel
fracturing, and it uses far more water.64 In slickwater
fracturing, operators inject millions of gallons of water down a
60. D.V. Satya Gupta & Baker Hughes, Unconventional Fracturing Fluids 22,
23, in ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROC. OF THE TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS FOR THE
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STUDY: CHEMICAL & ANALYTICAL METHODS (2011),
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/proce
edingsofhfchemanalmethodsfinalmay2011.pdf (comparing conventional fracturing fluids with unconventional ones, including “non-polymer-containing fluids,”
and noting that “[a]s the industry moves to extracting gas from tighter and tighter
formations, particularly formations such as shales or coalbeds . . ., fluids that are
non-damaging to the proppant pack and formation are becoming increasingly
important”); Jay A. Rushing & Richard B. Sullivan, Improved Water-Frac
Increases Production, EXPLORATION & PROD. MAG. (Oct. 12, 2007),
http://www.epmag.com/archives/ features/661.htm (describing “large conventional
gel treatments commonly employed during the 1980s”); Sun et al., supra note 7, at
1–2 (describing old treatments in which cross-linked polymer solutions were
needed to carry large quantities of proppant into the formation).
61. Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60.
62. See, e.g., Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59, at 1 (“Extracting
natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation requires horizontal drilling.”).
63. See infra note 118 (describing coalbed methane technologies and
chemicals).
64. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60 (describing the larger quantities of
water used); Gupta & Hughes, supra note 60, at 22–23 (2011) (describing the new
chemicals needed for fracturing, particularly slickwater fracturing in shales and
coalbeds); Bill Chase et al., Clear Fracturing Fluids for Increased Well
Productivity, OILFIELD REV., Autumn 1997, at 20–21, http://www.slb.com/~/
media/Files/resources/oilfield_review/ors97/aut97/clearfluids.pdf (describing new
“polymer-free fracturing fluids”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra
note 31, at 6-15 (“The total amount of fracturing additives and water used in
hydraulic fracturing of horizontal wells is considerably larger than for traditional
vertical wells.”).
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well at high pressure.65 When forced out of the wellbore far
underground, the water fractures the shale. The water contains
some chemicals to reduce the friction caused by water flowing
down the wellbore and also to carry proppants into the shale.66
These assumptions regarding new and old practices in oil
and gas production and the associated current risks, as
compared to old ones, are gross generalizations. In many shales
and tight sands, fracturing treatments employ a hybrid of old
fracturing technologies, which used large quantities of gel, and
new fracturing technologies, which use more water.67 In other
shales and tight sands, operators use more traditional gel or
hybrid gel and water treatments.68 And not all wells in shales
and tight sands are drilled horizontally.69
Despite these gross generalizations, the combination of
horizontal drilling and slickwater fracturing has enabled the
development of thousands of new wells that otherwise would
not have been drilled—thus substantially expanding the scale
of oil and gas development in the United States and the
associated cumulative environmental effects. Both horizontal
drilling and slickwater fracturing, however, do reduce certain
environmental effects, at least on an individual well basis.
Horizontal drilling allows operators to avoid sensitive surface
areas because they can drill a well thousands of feet from the
target underground formation and then drill laterally,
underground, to the target.70 For any given quantity of oil or
gas produced, this drilling practice also generates less waste71
than would have been generated by the large number of
vertical wells required to produce that quantity of oil or gas.
And although slickwater fracturing greatly increases the
65. Miskimins et al., supra note 28.
66. Sun et al., supra note 7, at 1–2.
67. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60 (“Hybrid water fracs still use water
to generate fracture width and length while keeping net pressures low. Following
creation of fracture geometry, gels with relatively low guar concentrations are
used to transport proppant down the fracture.”).
68. See, e.g., HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS, supra note 2, at 4 (noting a
hybrid gelled water frac used in the Bakken because of “more traditional frac
geometries”).
69. See J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS
FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE (2008), http://www.dec.
ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf.
70. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, DOE-FE-0385,
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 36 (1999), http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/
publications/environ_benefits/env_benefits.pdf.
71. Id.
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amount of water used at each well—as compared to drilling of
conventional wells and earlier fracturing techniques72—in
some cases, it uses less toxic chemicals than did earlier types of
fracturing.73 It is not clear whether, on net, the negative
environmental effects of the massive increase in well numbers
enabled by horizontal drilling and slickwater fracturing
outweigh the efficiencies and benefits that these technologies
have introduced on an individual well basis. This is an
important question to be further explored.74
One way of identifying potential environmental effects—
with the above definitional limitations in mind—is to explore
recent violations of environmental regulations and oil and gas,
which are primarily aimed at limiting environmental risk.
Understanding violations of these regulations can highlight the
problems caused by drilling and fracturing so far and thus,
potentially, the most prevalent risks. As described in more
detail below, with the valuable help of research assistants, I
collected information on recent violations of state
environmental regulations at oil and gas sites—most of which
also hosted fracturing activity—to paint a more concrete
picture of risk. Air emissions from drilling and fracturing;75 soil
erosion from well sites;76 soil compaction and road damage;77
surface spills of chemicals and wastes;78 leaking disposal
wells79 and discharge of improperly-treated wastes;80 methane
that migrates from wells into soil, water, and basements; and
improper well casing (which could contribute to future
underground methane leakage)81 all count as risks within this
72. See supra sources cited in note 64 and accompanying text.
73. Ricky McCurdy, High Rate Hydraulic Fracturing Additives in NonMarcellus Unconventional Shales, in U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600/R11/066, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS FOR THE HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING STUDY: CHEMICAL & ANALYTICAL METHODS 17, 21 (2011),
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/proce
edingsofhfchemanalmethodsfinalmay2011.pdf.
74. One of my forthcoming pieces will explore this phenomenon, which itself
may be a new risk. The simple expansion of well numbers could cause threshold
effects, linear expansions of harms that are not adequately enforced, and
unevenly distributed effects. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulating Regulatory
Diseconomies of Scale in Administrative Law (draft on file with author).
75. See infra notes 462–464 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 402–406 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 10.
78. See infra note 443 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 384 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 308–314 and accompanying text.
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framework. These risks vary substantially in magnitude,
however. A spill of thousands of gallons of an undiluted toxic
substance that migrates to a stream tributary will pose a much
higher risk than, say, a small amount of soil erosion from a
well site. I attempted to account for this variance by
categorizing the data along a spectrum of incidents that
appeared to have no environmental effects to those that may
have caused major impacts.
I collected much of the regulatory data analyzed in this
Article through a project funded by the Energy Institute at the
University of Texas. Using public records requests and reviews
of state regulatory databases, my research assistants and I
located regulations, violations, and alleged violations of
environmental and oil and gas regulations in several states
with a recent uptick in fracturing activity or with impending
fracturing development. The violations that we collected
included both notices of violation issued by inspectors—which
are only “alleged” or “informal” violations82—as well as
confirmed violations that led to various formal enforcement
actions, including, for example, settlements, administrative
orders, penalties and fines, and orders to remediate sites or
take other action. The violation data that we obtained had
several limitations, as discussed below.
My research assistants and I requested violation and
enforcement data from fifteen states but received only eight
responses that allowed for meaningful review.83 Information
82. We collected this broad range of violation data because states have a
variety of approaches to violations and enforcements. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE
REGS. § 404-1:522(a) (2012) (explaining how potential enforcement actions are
initiated, how inspectors may either “cause the operator to voluntarily remedy the
violation” or “issue an NOAV [Notice of Alleged Violation] to the operator,” which
triggers the enforcement process, and that operators can halt the NOAV process
by showing that no violation has occurred or by entering into a written agreement
with the Director of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission); Oil and
Gas Regulatory Enforcement, OHIO DEP’T. OF NAT. RES. (July 9, 2012),
http://ohiodnr.com/mineral/enforcement/tabid/17872/Default.aspx (“The division
generally maintains a standard operating procedure of escalating enforcement
measures from informal to formal, depending upon the nature of the violation.”);
Oil & Gas Industry: Compliance & Enforcement Policies and Procedures, MICH.
DEP’T. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogscompliance-factsheet_262981_7.pdf (noting that voluntary compliance with a
notice of violation allows an operator to avoid a formal Opportunity to Show
Compliance (OPTSC) meeting).
83. My research assistants and I sent inquiries to Arkansas, Colorado,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The eight states
for which we obtained usable data were Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, New
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from four of these states is described in detail in this Article,84
with several additional states providing anecdotal evidence. Of
the states described here, the records of violations and
enforcement actions taken—such as agreed compliance orders,
issuance of penalties, or mandatory remediation—provide
varying degrees of detail. Some include the type of substance
involved and the environmental resource affected, while others
only offer a cursory account of the activity leading to a
violation, such as a failure to plug a well.
The violation data that we identified was not
comprehensive, and in some cases may have included a small
number of wells that were not fractured. Many states do not
directly track whether wells are fractured; as a proxy, in
response to our data requests, these states identified violations
from wells in counties overlying shale gas and tight sands
formations or wells identified as producing from these
formations, which require fracturing for economic production.85
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. Of the eight states for which
we have usable data, I am continuing to characterize and sort the voluminous
violation data from Colorado, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and therefore only use
violations from these states as examples of incidents that can occur at shale gas
and tight sands sites. At the time of data collection, Wyoming had experienced a
very limited number of incidents at its twenty-five unconventional wells in the
Niobrara shale and the tight oil sands of the Sussex, Parkman, Turner, and
Frontier formations, and none resulted in fines or penalties. One involved an oil
spill that was “contained, remediated, and reclaimed,” and others involved
complaints about ground disturbance from seismic testing and the flaring of gas,
which were addressed on site without rule violations. E-mail from Thomas E.
Doll, P.E., State Oil and Gas Supervisor, Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission, to Jeremy Schepers (June 21, 2011) (on file with author). Of the
remaining seven states, Maryland and New York have no meaningful violation
data because no high-volume (slickwater) fracturing has yet occurred there. See
Marcellus Shale, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/
energy/46288.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (explaining that while the
Department completes its environmental review of high-volume fracturing,
applications to drill and fracture may only be approved after case-specific review);
Telephone Interview by Matthew Pena with Wes McBride, Engineer, Md. Dep’t of
Env’t, Mining Program (July 15, 2011) (explaining that no wells have yet been
permitted). We did not successfully obtain data from Montana, North Dakota, or
Oklahoma. Finally, the summary data of West Virginia violations that I received
from a research assistant requires further review and verification.
84. The data from Colorado, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are extensive and
require further analysis; enforcements from these states are discussed only
anecdotally in this paper. Data from West Virginia and Wyoming are excluded
because of the small size of the data sets obtained. Data from Louisiana,
Michigan, New Mexico (fractured tight sands), and Texas form the bulk of this
paper.
85. Miskimins et al., supra note 28 (noting that fracturing is “[r]equired for
unconventional reservoirs”).
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It is likely that a small number of the violations identified
occurred at wells that were not fractured.86 Further, we did not
locate all of the violations at shale and tight sands well sites in
each state. Some states, such as Texas, only provided violations
that led to administrative orders and/or penalties, which may
omit violations that were noted but resulted in less formal (or
no) enforcement action. Although the chief geologist at Texas’s
Railroad Commission describes the data that she provided to
me as a comprehensive set,87 inspectors there sometimes also
note minor issues at fractured sites, and this information was
unavailable.88 Further, for New Mexico, we were unable to
identify all violations—even those that resulted in formal
enforcement action. Because we located many of the New
Mexico violations from that state’s spills database, the violation
data there tend to be skewed toward spills. Table 1 summarizes
the types of wells for which we obtained violation data in each
of the states.
Table 1. Violation data: Types of wells studied
State
Louisiana

Well Types
Haynesville Shale wells89

Michigan
New Mexico
Pennsylvania90

Antrim Shale wells
Shale and tight sands wells (not comprehensive)
Marcellus Shale wells

Texas

Barnett Shale wells (“formal” enforcements only)

86. For the states for which I have not yet analyzed comprehensive violations,
I use violations as anecdotal evidence. Pennsylvania and Ohio incidents described
in this paper are incidents at shale wells that were fractured, unless otherwise
indicated. Wyoming incidents described also include incidents at shale sites only.
See E-mail from Jeremy Schepers to Hannah Wiseman (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:07 PM)
(on file with author). Michigan data include only Antrim shale wells—most of
which likely were fractured—and New Mexico data include only shale and tight
sand wells. See id. Texas data include only fractured shale wells. See E-mail from
Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., to Hannah Wiseman (Feb.
27, 2012, 9:01 AM) (on file with author).
87. E-mail from Leslie Savage to Hannah Wiseman (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:01 AM)
(on file with author) (noting that “[t]he information should be comprehensive” for
2008–2011).
88. See id.
89. E-mail from John Adams, Louisiana Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Molly Wurzer
(Sept. 28, 2011, 8:14 AM) (on file with author) (noting that “shale gas wells” is not
a field in Louisiana’s enforcement database and therefore tallying the inspections
that occurred at Haynesville Shale wells).
90. Violations used for anecdotal purposes only; not fully categorized for this
Article.

750

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Just as some of the violation data described in Part II is
from an incomplete set of violations, the time periods for which
we collected violations vary.91 Some states were willing to
provide violation data over a longer period than were others,
and some states have experienced substantial hydraulic
fracturing activity for a longer time period than have others. In
certain cases, violation data were therefore only available for
three to four years, regardless of a state agency’s willingness to
provide data. The time periods of the data collected are
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Violation data: Time periods studied
Louisiana

State

Time period
2008–201192

Michigan
New Mexico
Pennsylvania93

1999–2011
2000–2011
2008–2011

Texas

2007–2011

Due to the varied time periods and the lack of
comprehensive enforcement data in some states, the examples
of violations described in this Article should be viewed as
examples only—not as full accounts of incidents at shale and
tight sands well sites.
From the data that my research assistants and I obtained,
I roughly characterized each type of violation by the magnitude
of risk that likely attached to it, relying on the type of
substance causing a violation, the quantity of substance, the
environmental resource affected, and the seriousness of the
violation’s remedy, such as a requirement that the operator pay
a large penalty or remediate the site. I used five categories of
violations of state environmental laws, ranging from
procedural to major violations, as described in Table 3.94 These
91. Note that some time periods were for fiscal years rather than calendar
years. See, e.g., id.
92. Through July 14, 2011. E-mail from Molly Wurzer to Hannah Wiseman
(Apr. 8, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with author).
93. Violations used for anecdotal purposes only; not fully categorized for this
Article.
94. For additional description of the categories and the types of incidents that
I placed within these categories, see HANNAH WISEMAN, STATE ENFORCEMENT OF
SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 25 (funded by Univ. of Tex. at Austin
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categorizations do not fully capture the seriousness of
violations; the impact of substances spilled, for example, likely
varied depending on the exact type of soil or water affected.
Accurately judging the magnitude of various incidents would
require careful scientific and economic analysis. Further, the
examples of violations described in Part III of this Article tend
to be those that were categorized as “substantial” or “major.” I
use the most serious violations to highlight the worst-case
scenarios, but this threatens to skew the impression of risk.
The reader should be aware that a large percentage of the total
violations identified in each state studied were minor under my
rough characterizations of the magnitude of risk, as described
in Table 3.
Table 3. Likely magnitude of violations identified95
State

Louisiana
Michigan
New
Mexico
Texas

Procedural96

Minor–
no
effect:97

Minor

46%
33%
26%

31%
28%
1%

36%

0%

Substantial99

Major100

5%
24%
20%

18%
15%
42%

1%
0%
12%

23%

37%

5%

98

Finally, the violations that we identified tended to be from
shales and tight sands only and tended to involve natural gas.
This Article therefore does not fully address the risks of shale
oil development, which tend to be similar due to the similar
slickwater fracturing process used, and it entirely omits the
risks of other types of unconventional development that uses
fracturing, including coalbed methane development. When this
Article uses the term “shale gas,” it refers generally to
development in both shales and tight sands. More work is
needed in order to collect additional data from comparable time
periods; better understand the importance of each risk;
Energy Inst., Fla. St. U. C. of L., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 581, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992064.
95. See id. at 25.
96. For example, failure to post a sign or obtain permit; environmental effects
unknown.
97. Meaning no environmental resource apparently affected.
98. Meaning apparently minor effects on environmental resource.
99. Meaning possibly had relatively large effects (e.g., spills of a medium size
on site).
100. Meaning possibly had substantial effects (e.g., spills that migrated off site)
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measure the magnitude of environmental harm, if any, caused
by various violations; and identify other risks that may be
omitted here. Despite these many limitations, this Article aims
to redirect the policy and regulatory focus on tight gas by
providing an initial account of likely risks based on the
existing, albeit limited, data.
B.

Response Sources: Legislation, Regulation, Environmental Review, and Industry Practices

The “responses” to risk explored in Part III include both
existing laws and regulations—written before slickwater
fracturing was common—and recent modifications and
additions that recognize and respond to the rise of drilling and
fracturing. In many cases, agencies have attempted to fit
fracturing within old statutes and regulations (described
generally as “regulations” throughout the article), which do not
address many of the well development changes introduced by
fracturing.101 Existing regulations, therefore, frequently apply
only marginally to these practices, but they nonetheless count
as responses to fracturing risk, even if these responses force
square pegs into round holes. In other cases, the federal
government, states, regional compact commissions, and
municipalities have developed new controls for oil and gas
development and fracturing or have extensively changed
existing ones, thus engaging in a more direct response.102
101. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (in its regulations with
respect to pits for waste and drilling materials, failing to describe which
regulations apply to pits with fracturing materials and wastes); OKLA. ADMIN.
CODE § 165:10-3-10(c) (2012) (only describing portions of the existing code that
apply to fracturing). But see OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:10-3-10(a) (2012) (generally
prohibiting the pollution of water during fracturing); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §
165:10-3-10 (Westlaw 2012) (effective July 2012), http://www.occeweb.com/rules/
Web%20Ready%20Ch10%20FY13%2007-01-12%20searchable.pdf (requiring disclosure of chemicals); ST. REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS. (STRONGER),
OKLAHOMA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 4 (2011), http://www
.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF%20Review%201
-19-2011.pdf (noting that Oklahoma includes hydraulic fracturing in a five-year
“strategic review” of its regulatory program); Memorandum from Cristina Self,
R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., Off. General Counsel, Att’y to Barry T. Smitherman, R.R.
Comm’n. of Tex., Off. General Counsel, Chairman (July 17, 2012), http://www
.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/prop-amend-3-13-Aug21-2012.PDF (proposing amendments
to 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.13 regarding new casing and blowout prevention
requirements).
102. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N,
http://cogcc.state.co.us/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (follow “Rules” hyperlink in
blue menu to the left of the page, then follow “2008 Rulemaking” hyperlink, then
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The descriptions of regulatory responses in this Article rely
in part on regulatory information from an earlier study,103
which the University of Texas Energy Institute also funded. In
that study, I identified laws and regulations governing all
stages of the shale gas or tight sands fracturing process
through a comprehensive Lexis and Westlaw review of state
administrative codes and oil and gas statutes, searches of state
oil and gas and environmental agency websites, and a
literature review. Part III discusses regulations that have
emerged since that study, agency directives, voluntary industry
responses such as disclosure of fracturing chemicals, and other
less formal efforts to respond to the risks identified.
III. UNDERSTANDING RISK AND RESPONSE
As described in Part II, although fracturing is an old
practice,104 it is distinctly new in two important ways. First,
the specific practice of slickwater hydraulic fracturing has
introduced new processes to old fracturing techniques.105
Higher water use in fracturing requires, for example, larger
water withdrawals106 and more truck trips carrying water (if
water is not piped in) and chemicals to the site.107 Second,
slickwater fracturing has enabled the development of
follow “COGCC Amended Rules Redline”) (showing revisions to most portions of
Colorado’s oil and gas regulations); H.B. 1950 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2011),
available
at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm?
sYear=2011&sInd=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1950 (updating many regulations and
adding more stringent requirements for many unconventional (Marcellus) wells,
but further preempting local regulation (note that this Act is commonly referred
to as Act 13)); H.B. 401, 2011 Leg., 4th Spec. Sess. (W. Va. 2011), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2011_SESSIONS/4X/Bills/hb401%2
0enr.htm (adding W. VA. CODE 22-6-2a).
103. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31.
104. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d. 1, 7
(Tex. 2008) (noting that fracking was “[f]irst used commercially in 1949”);
Miskimins et al., supra note 28, (noting that “[i]n 1947, the first intentional
fracture treatment took place in the Hugoton gas field of western Kansas” and
“was called . . . a ‘hydrofrac’”).
105. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
106. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-93 to -94
(estimating that between 2.4 and 7.8 million gallons are required for each
hydraulic fracturing treatment of a 4,000-foot horizontal well).
107. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE NATURAL GAS RESOURCES IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 9 (2008),
http://www.eesi.psu.edu/news_events/EarthTalks/2009Spring/materials2009spr/N
atParkService-GRD-M-Shale_12-11-2008_view.pdf (estimating that “100 to 1,000
truckloads” are required for “Fracture Stimulation Fluids and Materials” and “100
to 150 truckloads” are required for “Fracture Stimulation Equipment”).
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thousands of new oil and gas wells in the United States.108 This
expands the magnitude of the long-known risks of drilling,
such as soil erosion and improper casing (lining) of wells to
prevent leakage of substances from wells into underground
resources.109
This Part proposes that these two core concerns, including
new stages of well development introduced by fracturing and a
rise in well drilling activity, should command the most
regulatory attention, and it details the specific risks underlying
these concerns. Part III.A. describes the relatively new risks
introduced by a higher rate of slickwater fracturing in several
regions of the country, and Part III.B. focuses on the risks
associated with higher drilling rates enabled by fracturing.
After describing each risk, Parts III.A. and B. discuss the
responses to risks that have emerged as shale gas and tight
sands development has boomed. City officials have entered into
contracts with oil and gas operators to protect local roads,110
108. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK EAST (BARNETT SHALE) DRILLING
PERMITS ISSUED (1993–2010) (on file with author) (showing 3,643 drilling permits
issued in 2007, 4,145 in 2008, 1,755 in 2009, and 2,157 in 2010 in the Barnett
Shale of Texas—a formation that requires fracturing to be economically
developed); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO AIR
REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET 2,
http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
26, 2012) (“11,400 new wells are fractured each year; another 14,000 are
refractured . . . .”). This appears to refer only to shale wells, as in some areas, 95
percent of all wells are fractured, and each of these areas has thousands of wells.
Miskimins et al., supra note 28; Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas
Mgmt., 2011 Wells Drilled January–November, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20Drilled.gif (last updated Dec. 5,
2011) (showing 1,751 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in Pennsylvania); NEWARK,
EAST (BARNETT SHALE) FIELD, supra note 6 (although not all permits issued
result in drilling and fracturing, 1,231 permits were issued for Barnett Shale
wells from January 2011 through December 2011).
109. See, e.g., Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal
Exploration, Development and Production Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 25446, 25446 (July
6, 1988), http://epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oil/og88wp.pdf (summarizing damage associated with the handling and disposal of oil and gas wastes and
state regulatory gaps); Tribal Energy and Envtl. Info. Clearinghouse, Oil and Gas
Drilling/Development Impacts, http://teeic.anl.gov/er/oilgas/impact/drilldev/index
.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (noting that “[v]egetation and topsoil would be
removed” for access roads and describing other access road impacts); id. (noting
the “potential for increased erosion” as a result of well pad development); id.
(noting the risk of improper handling and releases “to the environment”). Cf.
Rozell & Reaven, supra note 58, at 1386–87 (describing methods of estimating
well casing failure rates).
110. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-142 to -143
(noting that “[m]unicipalities may require trucks transporting hazardous
materials to travel on designated routes, in accordance with a road use
agreement”); GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, MODERN SHALE GAS
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and state legislatures have required disclosure of the chemicals
used in fracturing.111 State oil and gas and environmental
agencies have applied existing regulations at well sites or have
updated regulations and written new ones, and regional water
basin commissions have proposed more controls on
fracturing.112 In addition to initiating a study of the water
quality impacts of shale gas development113 and demanding
information about wastewater management from operators,114
the EPA has finalized new regulations under the Clean Air
Act115 and has begun to propose limited regulations in other
areas.116 As this Part discusses, although several levels of
government have made progress toward addressing the risks
identified here, much more effort will be required to fully
address the impacts of shale gas development.
A.

New Stages of Well Development Introduced by
Slickwater Fracturing

Hydraulic fracturing of an oil or gas well has one core
purpose: cracking the formation around a drilled well to
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 50 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oilgas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_pri
mer_2009.pdf (describing road use agreements).
111. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2012) (Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical
Disclosure Requirements, adoption approved at conference, Dec. 13, 2011).
112. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/naturalgas-REVISE
Ddraftregs110811.pdf.
113. See supra note 36.
114. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information
from Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal
(May 12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/
4816775AD0E881AB8525788E006A91ED.
115. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg.
49490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
116. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA INITIATES RULEMAKING TO SET
DISCHARGE STANDARDS FOR WASTEWATER FROM SHALE GAS EXTRACTION 1 (Oct.
2011), http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/upload/shalereporterfactsheet.
pdf (explaining that “EPA plans to propose new standards for public comment in
2014” for wastewater from shale gas extraction); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA
816-R-12-004, PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS—DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION PROGRAM
GUIDANCE #84 (2012), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic
fracturing/upload/hfdieselfuelsguidance508.pdf
(proposing
guidelines
for
fracturing with diesel fuels, including information to be submitted by operators
applying for Safe Drinking Water Act permits, which are required in order to
fracture with diesel; definitions of the substances that include diesel; and
improved casing and reporting requirements, among other protections).
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increase the exposed surface area and allow fossil fuels to flow
from the formation and into the well.117 The techniques
followed to achieve this goal are complex and vary
substantially among wells and the formations into which wells
are drilled.118 Fracturing of coalbeds for methane has been
common for several decades, inspiring a federal lawsuit,119 a
criticized EPA review,120 and some modified state
regulations.121 But it is the more recent technique of slickwater
fracturing in shales and tight sand formations122 that has
triggered a fundamental change in domestic energy, enlivening
this country’s economy and, in some cases, shaking its trust in
domestic oil and gas development. Although experts dispute
estimates of gas reserves,123 initial production numbers suggest
117. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 3–4 (2004), available at
http://www.water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/completestudy.zip.
118. See, e.g., id. at 3–6 (describing some coalbed methane fractures that occur
at depths less of less than 1,000 feet); id. at 3-11 (indicating that typical water
volumes used in coalbed methane wells involve a “maximum average injection
volume of 150,000 gal/well and a median average injection volume of 57,500
gal/well”); ALL CONSULTING & MONT. BD. OF OIL AND GAS CONSERV., COAL BED
METHANE PRIMER: NEW SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS: ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPLICATIONS 10 (Feb. 2004), http://www.all-llc.com/publicdownloads/CBMPRI
MERFINAL.pdf (“CBM wells are typically no more than 5000 feet in depth,
although some deeper wells have been drilled.”); GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL,
supra note 110, at 18–21 (noting that the Barnett Shale occurs at a “depth of
6,500 feet to 8,500 feet,” that the Fayetteville is between 1,000 and 7,000 feet
deep, the Haynesville is between 10,500 and 13,500 feet deep, and that the
Marcellus occurs between 4,000 and 8,500 feet below ground).
119. Legal Envtl. Assist. Found. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997).
120. Members of Congress and a whistleblower argued that EPA had failed to
explain why it changed certain data in the report and that report peer reviewers
had conflicts of interest. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of
Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 134 n.106 (2009).
121. See, e.g., MONTANA DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, BD. OF OIL AND GAS, FINAL
COALBED METHANE ORDER FOR POWDER RIVER BASIN CONTROLLED
GROUNDWATER AREA, Order No. 99-99 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at
http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/CBMOrder.asp (requiring operators to “offer water
mitigation agreements to owners of water wells or natural springs within one-half
mile of a CBM field proposed for approval”); WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N
RULE 3-23(a)(i)(B) (2010), http://soswy.state.wy.us/Rules/RULES/7928.pdf (“The
Supervisor, on a site specific basis, may require the use of blowout preventers or
other methods of controlling shallow coalbed methane wells.”).
122. See infra note 124.
123. See, e.g., PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Marcellus Shale,
http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/topogeo/econresource/oilandgas/marcellus/marcellus_f
aq/marcellus_shale/index.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (explaining that for
projections of recoverable gas reserves in the Marcellus Shale, “[i]ndustrial and
academic assessments vary from 50 to 500 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)”); PENN. STATE
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that natural gas from shales will be the dominant source of
domestic natural gas by 2035 if slickwater fracturing continues
unabated.124 Slickwater fracturing in shales, in particular, will
continue to challenge U.S. environmental policy as it expands.
1.

Using Some New Chemicals

Drilling a traditional oil or gas well involves several
stages. An oil or gas operator constructs a well pad and a road
to the pad; brings drilling rigs and other equipment to the site;
pumps or trucks in water and chemicals to the site to use in
drilling fluid and drilling mud (which cools the drill bit as it
moves through the formation125); drills a vertical well and
cements casing (metal tubes) into the well; stores drilling
wastes on site in earthen surface pits or metal tanks; and
disposes of these wastes.126 Once the well begins producing, the
operator restores most of the site and leaves small amounts of
equipment at the wellhead and small oil or gas collector lines
on site.127 When gas or oil eventually stops flowing in economic
quantities from the well, the operator plugs it and removes the
remaining equipment.128 Hydraulically fractured wells all
require these drilling steps—which are similar to the steps that
always have been required for drilling conventional wells.129
(Hydraulically fractured wells often are deeper,130 however,
EXTENSION, How Much Natural Gas Can the Marcellus Shale Produce? (Feb. 5,
2012), http://extension.psu.edu/naturalgas/news/2012/how-much-natural-gas-canthe-marcellus-shale-produce (summarizing various estimates for the Marcellus).
124. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., What Is Shale Gas and Why is it Important? (Dec.
5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (follow “Download Figure Data” under “U.S. dry natural gas production trillion cubic feet”;
percentage calculations on file with author) (projecting that by 2035, 50 percent of
the U.S. dry natural gas supply will come from shales, followed by tight gas at 22
percent, non-associated offshore gas (gas not tightly attached to a formation such
as a coalbed or shale) at 6 percent, non-associated onshore gas at 6 percent, gas
associated with oil at 5 percent, and coalbed methane at 6 percent).
125. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, Water Use in Deep Shale Gas Exploration 1 (May
2012), http://www.chk.com/media/educational-library/fact-sheets/corporate/water_
use_fact_sheet.pdf.
126. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-25 to -39.
127. Id. at 5-139 to -140.
128. Id. at 5-143 to -144.
129. See id. at 1-3 to -4 (describing how high-volume (slickwater) fracturing
involves stages of oil and gas development already studied in a previous generic
environmental impact statement but also introduces new concerns).
130. NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ASSOC., Unconventional Natural Gas Resources,
http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/unconvent_ng_resource.asp (last visited Dec.
15, 2012).
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and often use a horizontal wellbore in addition to a vertical
one.131) The addition of slickwater fracturing to the well
development process introduces several new stages: On an
individual well basis—as compared to conventional wells and
older fracturing techniques—slickwater fracturing requires
more water and uses new chemicals.132
a.

Risks: Chemical Spills During Transport and
Transfer on Site

Slickwater hydraulic fracturing relies primarily on
water133 that is injected at high pressure down a well to
fracture a formation and to carry proppant into the fractures to
hold them open.134 Chemicals, although used in much smaller
quantities,135 are also an integral part of the process. The
operator trucks chemicals to a site and stores them on site in
preparation for fracturing.136 Many of the chemicals sit in large
plastic tanks on the beds of trucks, and others are surrounded
by thick metal “boxes.”137 After the operator drills and cases a
well, she punches holes in or “perforates” small portions of the
well and casing.138 Following well perforation, she pumps acid
(often hydrochloric acid) out of a storage tank and down the
well.139 This acid moves beyond the perforated portions of the
well, cleaning the perforations and the shale around them and
preparing the formation for fracturing.140 The acid also can
help to induce fractures.141
Following the acid treatment, the operator begins the
131. See Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59.
132. See supra note 60. As noted supra note 73, at 21, these chemicals are
sometimes less toxic than those previously used in fracturing.
133. See CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, supra note 125 (explaining that the company
uses water both for drilling and fracturing and that it is “an essential component”
of deep shale gas development).
134. See Miskimins et al., supra note 28 (explaining that sand is used to “[p]rop
fractures open to enable gas production”).
135. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-53 to -54; see
also Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the Marcellus
Shale, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., Dec. 6-7, 2010, at 3 (estimating that
chemicals comprise 0.1 percent of the mixture).
136. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-80.
137. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-80 to -82.
138. BRAD HANSEN, DEVON ENERGY CORP., CASING PERFORATING OVERVIEW,
http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/casingperforatedoverview.pdf.
139. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-50.
140. Id.
141. Author visit to Woodford Shale fracturing site, Oct. 28, 2011 (operator
explained that acids can help to induce fractures).
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fracture treatment, injecting water and chemicals into the well.
The chemicals, which represent about 0.5 percent of the
fracture solution by weight (approximately twenty-five
thousand gallons if five million gallons of water are used for a
fracture treatment),142 can contain a variety of substances.
Some, as industry emphasizes, are common chemicals found in
cosmetics and foods.143 Others are highly toxic.144 A report
prepared by the minority staff of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, which surveyed fourteen hydraulic
fracturing companies in the United States, noted that in a fiveyear period (2005–2009), these companies “used more than
2,500 hydraulic fracturing products containing 750 chemicals
and other components”—a total of 780 million gallons.145 By
volume, methanol was the most common chemical used in
fracturing.146
The effects of these many chemicals vary depending on
their properties (whether they are toxic or not and, if toxic,
their level of toxicity147), the ways that they change when
introduced to environmental media (they may break down into
other substances, for example, or be diluted148), and the routes
by which humans and wildlife may be exposed to them,149
among many other factors.150
Indeed, the quantity of chemicals used per fractured well
appears to have declined, thus reducing certain chemical
risks.151 As more wells are fractured, however, this could
introduce chemicals to new areas. As illustrated by the
environmental violations that have occurred so far at
unconventional wells, this poses several risks—particularly at

N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-51 to -54.
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-76.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG.,
CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (Apr. 19, 2011) (describing some
of the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing as “extremely toxic”).
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 1.
147. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-75.
148. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 35, at 7-5.
149. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-75.
150. See, e.g., id. at 5-75 (noting that fully understanding the effects of various
spills would require “information specific to the event such as the specific
additives being used and site-specific information about exposure pathways and
environmental contaminant levels”).
151. Id. at 5-39 (noting that a consulting company “states that the
development of water fracturing technologies has reduced the quantity of
chemicals required to hydraulically fracture target reservoirs”).
142.
143.
144.
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the surface.152
Chemicals used in fracturing may be spilled while being
transported to the site, stored on site, or transferred to water
for fracturing, and these spills can have significant impacts.
One university study, which explored potential water
contamination from spills combined with other incidents, such
as leaking wells, concluded that in the Marcellus Shale alone,
these combined incidents could potentially contaminate water
volumes equal to “a few thousand Olympic-sized swimming
pools;”153 the study concluded that this was a “potential
substantial risk.”154 Indeed, spills—one of the potential
contributors to water contamination—have been a somewhat
common incident at shale gas and tight sands sites so far. In
Pennsylvania in 2010 an unknown quantity of fracturing fluid
was released from a trailer into a ditch,155 and about ten
barrels of fracturing fluid escaped from a surface pit that had a
tear in its liner.156 A tank with an improperly shut valve at a
Marcellus site in Pennsylvania also released about five barrels
of fracturing fluids onto the ground,157 and an unnamed
quantity of fracturing fluid, antifreeze, and other substances
spilled at another site.158 Another tank with a valve open
released nearly 13,000 gallons (nearly 309 barrels) of frac fluid,
some of which entered surface water.159
152. As noted in Part I, because I was unable to obtain comprehensive
information on violations in certain states, such as New Mexico, the violations
involving risks posed by chemicals, such as surface spills, may represent only a
portion of the actual number of incidents. The actual risks posed by the spills also
differ in ways that cannot be fully identified by the information available about
environmental violations. In some cases, for example, spills may have been fully
recovered and cleaned up by an operator without this information being included
in an agency report, thus suggesting that the spill, although sounding
problematic, resulted in limited or no environmental harm. In other cases, spills
of unidentified substances may be more problematic than they sound—if, for
example, they entered surface waters or involved highly toxic substances.
153. Rozell & Reaven, supra note 58, at 1391.
154. Id.
155. Sullivan, violation no. 601902, 601903 (Dec. 2010), Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl.
Protection Prot. (no permit number noted).
156. Permit no. 015-20613, violation no. 596121, Armenia (Sept. 2010), Penn.
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot.
157. Permit no. 129-28075, violation no. 588239, Fairfield (May 2010), Penn.
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot.
158. Permit no. 081-20128 (Mar. 2010), Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot, Lycoming
(notice of violation).
159. Press Release, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot, DEP Investigating Lycoming
County Fracking Fluid Spill at XTO Energy Marcellus Well (Nov. 22, 2010),
available at, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/
14287?id=15315&typeid=1.
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Chemicals that are transferred and stored in a relatively
undiluted state likely pose the highest risk when spilled at the
surface,160 but diluted chemicals in the water that flows back
up out of the well after fracturing—“flowback” water—also can
pose risks when stored, transferred, and disposed of, as
discussed in Part III.A.2.a, below. Governments at several
levels have only responded in limited ways to the types of
chemicals used in fracturing, thus shifting most of the work of
limiting risk to regulations that address chemical
transportation,
spill
prevention
and
response,
and
containment.
b.

Responses: Identifying Fracturing Chemicals
Used, and Employing Some New Spill
Prevention and Containment Practices

Much of the policy response to fracturing has focused on
obtaining information about the chemicals used. As introduced
above, the House Democratic minority on the Energy
Commerce Committee demanded information on chemicals
used from fourteen companies,161 and states, too, have jumped
on the chemical disclosure bandwagon.162 In further efforts to
identify the chemicals used and their potential impacts,
Congressman Waxman163 has held hearings about fracturing
chemicals and their toxicity,164 several Cornell professors have
expressed concerns about the toxicity of chemicals used in
fracturing,165 and a number of comments on recently proposed
160. Cf. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-74
(explaining that the use of setbacks is important because it “prevents direct flow
of the full, undiluted volume of a spilled contaminant into a surface water body”).
161. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG.,
CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (Apr. 19, 2011).
162. For a summary of disclosure requirements, see WISEMAN & GRADIJAN,
supra note 31, at 86–91.
163. Congressman Henry A. Waxman, 30th Congressional District of
California.
164. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG.,
HR’G SUMMARY: HR’G ON OIL AND GAS EXEMPTIONS IN FED. ENVTL. PROTS.,
available
at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/
20080602114913.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (prepared by Committee
Chairman Rep. Henry A. Waxman).
165. SUSAN RIHA ET AL., N.Y. STATE DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERV., COMMENTS ON
DRAFT SGEIS ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 4,
http://blogs.cornell.edu/nyswri/files/2010/01/Comments-on-draft-sGEIS-for-Marce
llus-Shale.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (“Ensuring proper well bore casing is
critical to reducing exposure of fresh groundwater resources to chemicals used in
drilling and fracking, as well as migration of contaminants from deeper

762

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

regulations similarly focus on the alleged potential for a toxic
soup to emerge at fracturing sites.166
The use of chemicals in the fracturing process itself—the
injection of water and chemicals at high pressure down a
well—remains
largely
unregulated
due
to
historic
interpretations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) and
an explicit exemption in 2005.167 Fracturing with diesel fuel,
however, is not exempt from the SDWA,168 and the EPA has
produced draft guidance directing states how to review and
issue permits for fracturing that uses diesel fuel.169 For the
many wells for which diesel is not used in fracturing, states
have typically not supplemented the SDWA exemption with
their own limits on the types of chemicals that may be injected
in order to fracture a well.170
The handling of chemicals is, however, regulated to
varying degrees. A number of state regulations that existed
prior to fracturing already require spill control and response
plans and likely will cover new types of spills that occur.171
formations to formations containing potable groundwater.”). But see generally id.
(expressing a number of concerns beyond chemical contamination of
groundwater).
166. See, e.g., Mont. Dep’t. of Nat. Resources, Hydraulic Fracturing
Rulemaking, Written & E-mailed Comments (2011), http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/
PDF/CombinedComments.pdf (showing comments such as, “I want to know what
is in the chemicals as they will end up in my food and water.”; “How would you
like to have someone inject a variety of unknown but certain-to-be-hazardous
substances into your water supply?”; “Wells have already been seriously
contaminated elsewhere”; and “Please assure us that the fracking chemicals will
be SAFE if they drift into the water table . . . .”); Comment submitted by Anthony
Romano regarding the N.Y. State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation Supplemental
Generic Envtironmental Impact Statement for the Oil and & Gas Solution Mining
Program, Oct. 28, 2009 Hearing, http://catskillcitizens.org/learnmore/romanoc
omments.pdf (arguing that “[s]ince the shale sits below the aquifer which provides
Sullivan county residents, (who mainly rely on wells for their water) it leaves too
much room for errors and contamination of our fresh water supply,” but also
noting other potential effects) (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (d)(1) (2012) (exempting hydraulic fracturing from the
definition of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water Act, with the
exception of hydraulic fracturing with diesel).
168. Id.
169. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-12-004, PERMITTING GUIDANCE
FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS—
DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION PROGRAM GUIDANCE #84 (2012),
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hfdie
selfuelsguidance508.pdf.
170. But see IDAHO ADMIN. CODE. r. 20.07.02.056 (2012) (prohibiting certain
volatile organic compound use).
171. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 95–96 (describing states’
spill control and response plans, which require, for example, that pits must have
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These apply to the handling of both fracturing and oil and gas
wastes, requiring, for example, staff training, reporting
procedures if spills occur, and other safety measures.172
Transporters of chemicals also already must comply with the
Department
of
Transportation’s
hazardous
transport
regulations, which require labeling of trucks, driver training,
and minimum designs for containers and trucks that help to
prevent spills during traffic accidents, among other
protections.173 Some states, however, have implemented
updated transport and handling rules. New York has suggested
that towns could more stringently regulate the transportation
of hazardous fracturing chemicals174 and has proposed
secondary containment, such as drip pans, beneath chemical
transfer operations.175 Colorado also requires that containers
storing fracturing chemicals contain safety information.176
Several other states have updated secondary containment
requirements to ensure that if tanks with chemicals spill, the
chemicals will not contaminate the site or run off site.177
Although few regulations limit the type of chemical used,
and a limited set of requirements guides the handling of
chemicals, informational mandates abound. Operators under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act must maintain
material safety data sheets for all of the chemicals stored on
site in certain threshold quantities,178 although they may claim
trade secret status for the chemicals.179 The Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act gives the public

containment dikes to catch spills, see, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.2006 (2012),
and that all materials leaked or spilled as a result of drilling operations be
confined, see, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-16 (2011). However, as shown by the
West Virginia regulation, not all of these regulations apply directly to fracturing.).
172. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 95–96.
173. 49 C.F.R. §§ 17–80 (2011).
174. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-143 (noting
that “[m]unicipalities may require trucks transporting hazardous materials to
travel on designated routes, in accordance with a road use agreement”).
175. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION
MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 1337 app. 10 at 9 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.
dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf.
176. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 210(d) (2011).
177. See, e.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 603(e)(12)
(implementing secondary containment requirements for high-density areas); 58
PA. CODE 3218.2(d) (2012), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/
US/HTM/2012/0/0013.HTM (expanding secondary containment requirements).
178. 42 U.S.C. 11005, 11021–22 (2011).
179. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (2010).
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only limited access to these data sheets,180 and some states
have responded to demands for better public information in a
surprisingly
quick
fashion.
Arkansas,181
Colorado,182
183
184
185
Montana,
New York,
New Mexico,186 North
Louisiana,
187
188
Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania,189 Texas,190 West
Dakota,
191
192
Virginia, and Wyoming, among others, all require or have
proposed to mandate that operators disclose to state agencies
all chemicals used, and several of these states allow public
access to this information.193 All of these states allow operators
to claim trade secret status for their chemicals, with limited
exceptions.194 Thus, operators can sometimes avoid granting
public access to certain chemical information.
Requiring disclosure of fracturing chemicals appears to be
far more palatable to legislators and agencies than imposing
substantive limits on the chemicals used—particularly because
the industry has partnered with state regulators to create a
voluntary chemical disclosure website.195 Disclosure is an
180. 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(2).
181. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE 19(k) (2012).
182. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A (2012).
183. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX.118 (2011).
184. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1015(2) (2011).
185. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-32.
186. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.3.11 (2011).
187. N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1 (2)(i) (2012).
188. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10(b) (2012).
189. 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3222(b.1)(1)(i) (2012).
190. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (c)(2)(A)(ix),(x),(xi) (2012).
191. W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6-22 (2012).
192. WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 3-45(d) (2010), http://sos
wy.state.wy.us/Rules/RULES/7928.pdf.
193. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX.118 (2011) (proposing disclosure to the
Department of Natural Resources or on FracFocus); MONT. ADMIN. R.
36.22.1015(2) (2011) (requiring disclosure to the agency or on FracFocus); N.M.
CODE R. § 19.15.3.11 (2011) (requiring disclosure to the agency or on the public
FracFocus website); SGEIS on the Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Regulatory
Program, supra note 18 (noting that the information will be publicly available); 16
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2) (2012) (requiring public access); Rebecca Torrellas,
Wyoming Forces Frac Fluid Disclosure, EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION MAG. (Sept.
2, 2010), http://www.epmag.com/2010/September/item66859.php (suggesting that
there will be public access in Wyoming even though only disclosure to agency is
required).
194. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 90 (describing and citing to
trade secret protections within state regulations and describing exceptions, such
as requirements that health care professionals have access to chemical data); see
also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(4), (f)(1) (2012) (allowing certain parties to
appeal trade secret status).
195. FRAC FOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/ (last
visited Dec. 9, 2012).
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essential step. It allows the public to participate in the
fracturing policy dialogue with a better understanding of the
chemicals that are being transported to and stored on sites and
injected into wells. It also allows agencies to formulate laws
about chemical handling with better knowledge of the toxicity
and quantity of the chemicals involved. Disclosure laws fail to
directly address, however, whether certain fracturing
chemicals should be banned or allowed only in limited
quantities, and thus leave substantial holes.
2.

Fracturing: Producing, Storing, and Disposing of
New Waste

The use of new fracturing chemicals at well sites, in
addition to raising the potential for spills and improper
storage, introduces new wastes to the oil and gas production
process. Traditional oil and gas wells generate a number of
wastes, including drill cuttings (soil and rocks) and produced
water, which comes up naturally out of a formation.196
Depending on the nature of the formation drilled, both of these
types of wastes can be “salty”197 and sometimes have low levels
of naturally occurring radioactive materials.198 Fracturing adds
a new waste to this mix. After an operator injects water and
chemicals down the well and ends the fracturing treatment,
some of the water-chemical mixture flows back up to the
surface.199 The operator must transfer this flowback water to a
pit or a tank on the surface and then to a site for disposal.200
Disposal of flowback water occurs in an underground injection
196. Joseph Dancy, Solid Waste Management and Environmental Regulation of
Commonly Encountered Oil Field Wastes, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.
SPECIAL INST. 3, 13 (1994).
197. Id. at 5–6 (“[T]he average TDS [(total dissolved solids)] level of produced
water (50,000 ppm) exceeds the solids content of seawater (approx. 34,500 ppm).”).
198. R. Timothy Weston, Water and Wastewater Issues in Conducting
Operations in a Shale Play—The Appalachian Basin Experience, in
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE MAJOR SHALE PLAYS 34 (2010), available at
http://www.klgates.com/publications/weston_article.
199. BARCLAY R. NICHOLSON, FRACKING: ARE THE REGULATORS COMING OR
NOT? A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 10 (2011),
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/20110928FrackingAretheRegulator
sComingorNot.pdf (noting that fracturing “[p]roduces large volumes of fluids
called ‘flowback’”).
200. AM. PETROL. INST., WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING 17–18 (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/HF2_e1.pdf
(noting that fluids from fracturing and other processes typically are stored in
“tanks or lined surface impoundments”).
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control well or wastewater treatment plant, or the operator
reuses the water to fracture another well.201 The management
and disposal of flowback poses several risks that regulators
have not adequately addressed, as discussed in this Section.
Flowback can spill on the surface while being transferred to
storage. When improperly disposed of in underground injection
control wells, it also can, in rare instances, create localized
earthquakes and potentially contaminate underground water
sources. Finally, if inadequately treated and discharged, it can
contribute to surface water pollution.
a.

Risks: Surface Spills From Pits and Tanks,
Inadequate Wastewater Treatment, Leaking
Disposal Wells, and Earthquakes

Flowback water, which sometimes contains benzene,
toluene, xylene, and other toxic chemicals,202 emits volatile
organic compounds (“VOCs”), which have a variety of health
effects.203 Flowback water may also spill when transferred,
thus potentially contaminating soils with salty water with low
levels of chemicals.204 A number of flowback spills have
occurred at well sites. In Pennsylvania, an operator moving
flowback from a water holding tank to a reserve pit allowed the
hose to fall out of the pit, thus discharging flowback onto the
site’s surface.205 Other inspections noted general releases of
flowback to the ground,206 one of which was associated with a
“large area of dead” vegetation.207 A number of violations of
state environmental and oil and gas laws have also occurred as
a result of storing flowback on site in pits or tanks prior to
201. See Dianne Rahm, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays:
The Case of Texas, 39 ENERGY POLICY 2974, 2976 (2011) (discussing disposal);
WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 111–14, 123 (describing state requirements for flowback disposal).
202. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 2.
203. Id.
204. Cf. MARY BETH ADAMS ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, EFFECTS OF
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATURAL GAS WELL AND ASSOCIATED PIPELINE ON THE
NATURAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES OF THE FERNOW EXPERIMENTAL FOREST 12
(2011), http://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/gtr/gtr_nrs76.pdf (discussing a controlled
application of salty flowback to national forest, showing vegetation die-off).
205. Permit no. 027-21505, violation no. 598916, Burnside, Penn. Dep’t. of
Envtl. Prot., Oct. 2010.
206. Permit no. 081-20196, violation no. 588780, Shrewsbury, Penn. Dep’t. of
Envtl. Prot., May 2010.
207. Permit no. 015-20326, violation no. 586721, West Burlington, Penn. Dep’t.
of Envtl. Prot. (notice of violation).
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disposal and allowing spills. In Ohio, an inspector noted
leaking frac tanks and “fill spots” south of the tanks208 and
flowback “dumping down the hill”; at this latter site, the
inspector observed that the “[g]round still is not growing grass
and several big trees have been killed.”209 Another site had “a
couple of valves leaking on the frac tanks” and an oil spill and
brine near the tanks.210 One operator drilling and fracturing in
the Marcellus Shale that underlies Pennsylvania allowed
“ongoing flowback leaks from tanks,” which caused “several
spills,”211 and an impoundment that was not “structurally
sound” caused a flowback spill that extended “roughly 800 to
1,000 feet” from the well site and, like another flowback spill,
was associated with a “[l]arge swath of dead vegetation.”212 In
another case involving potential off-site migration of flowback,
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
noted that surface water from a leaking flowback pit “surfaced”
in a pasture “adjacent to” the well pad.213 The flowback had
apparently migrated about one hundred feet.214 A frac tank in
Pennsylvania similarly spilled flowback that “migrated off [a]
well pad” toward surface water,215 and another flowback spill
entered a drainage ditch.216
At tight sand wells in New Mexico, the Oil Conservation
Division also noted several surface spills of flowback from
storage units.217 In one case, a valve left open during fracturing
of a well released 245 gallons of “frac water” that contained 2
percent potassium chloride, all of which was recovered.218 In
208. 34111227680000, 818583295, Monroe, Franklin, Ohio Dep’t. of Envtl.
Conserv., May 14, 2008, (violation, follow-up to notice of violation 1380926203).
209. 34167296270000, 1246335529, Washington, Independence, Ohio Dep’t. of
Envtl. Conserv., June 3–4, 2008 inspection (violation).
210. 34019203250000, 964324099, Carol, Rose, Ohio Dep’t. of Envtl. Conserv.,
June 18, 2008 inspection (violation).
211. Permit no. 015-20209, violation no. 586310, Burlington, Penn. Dep’t. of
Envtl. Prot., May 2010 (notice of violation).
212. Permit no. 015-20016, Burlington, violation no. 588163, Penn. Dep’t. of
Envtl. Prot., May 2010.
213. Permit no. 117-20368, violation no. 586294, Tioga, Shippen, May 3, 2010
inspection, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., (notice of violation).
214. Permit no. 117-20368, Shippen, violation nos. 586293, 587064, Penn.
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., May 2010.
215. Permit no. 117-20409, violation no. 590077, Jackson , Penn. Dep’t. of
Envtl. Prot., Dec. 2010.
216. Permit no. 035-21179, Noyes, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., Jan. 2011
(notice of violation).
217. The documents refer to the substance as “frac water.”
218. Permit no. 30-045-34625, incident nRMD 0928649711 (December 2008),
Oil Conservation Div. (violation noted).
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others, corroded bottoms of tanks caused five219 to fifty220
barrels of frac water (also 2 percent potassium chloride) to be
released on site, some of which the operator recovered. An
operator who mistakenly poured fluids into a leaky tank
released fifteen barrels of frac water.221 And, in a final incident
attributed to vandalism, someone opened two tanks that held
fluids, releasing 800 gallons, which were not recovered.222
When an operator moves flowback water off site to
dispose of it, additional risks emerge. In many states, flowback
and produced water is disposed of in Class II underground
injection control (“UIC”) wells, which are deep wells
constructed for the disposal of oil and gas wastes.223 Although
these wells are regulated under the federal SDWA,224 which is
typically administered through a state permitting program,
wells can, in rare situations, fail and pollute underground
waters.225 They also have caused localized earthquakes.226 Both
of these effects are discussed in Part II.B. below, which
addresses produced water disposal.
If UIC well space is limited, as it is in Pennsylvania,227
flowback water is sometimes shipped to wastewater treatment
plants.228 As Marcellus Shale operators trucked thousands of
219. Permit no. 30-045-34507, incident no. nRMD0928247679 (Sept. 2009), Oil
Conservation Div. (violation noted).
220. Permit no. 30-045-34705, incident no. nRMD0928239664 (Oct. 2009), Oil
Conservation Div. (violation noted). Another incident released seven barrels of
frac water. See Permit no. 30-045-34709, incident no. nBP0918952242 (Mar.
2009), Oil Conservation Div. (violation noted).
221. Permit no. 30-039-30603, incident no. nRMD0924752168 (May 2009), Oil
Conservation Div. (violation noted).
222. Permit no. 30-045-34815, violation no. KGR0910634065 (Mar. 2009), Oil
Conservation Div.
223. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean
Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 621–22 (Tex. 2011) (“A company fracking a well must
dispose of the resulting waste. Most companies do so by injecting the waste into
subsurface zones which are naturally saline environments, usually in old wells
converted to injection wells.”).
224. Bruce M. Kramer, A Short History of Federal Statutory and Regulatory
Concerns Relating to Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.:
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CORE ISSUES AND TRENDS, no. 5, 2011 2-5 to -11
(describing the regulation of Class II wells under the Act and the cooperative
federalist approach to this regulation, which involves both the EPA and the
states).
225. See infra note 384.
226. See infra note 385.
227. See PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 11 (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/
only one commercial class II UIC well in Pennsylvania).
228. AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 20 (noting that “[w]ater used in the
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gallons of flowback and produced water to old wastewater
treatment plants in Pennsylvania in 2011, The New York
Times expressed concerns that these plants were not equipped
to handle these large quantities of wastes—some of them
containing substances not previously encountered by the
treatment plants—and were discharging waste with low levels
of radioactivity into rivers.229 The EPA subsequently expressed
alarm that plants operating under old permits might be
accepting new waste that they could not adequately treat,230
leading the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection to respond that testing near these plants’ discharge
points showed safe water quality levels.231 The EPA was not
satisfied with this response, however, and demanded more
testing;232 it also used the investigative portion of the Clean
Water Act to request records from several large fracturing
companies, demanding to know how they had been handling
their wastewater from drilling and fracturing.233 The
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, in the
meantime—with the permission of Governor Corbett—
“requested” that operators stop sending their drilling and
fracturing waste to grandfathered plants.234 The challenges
associated with flowback disposal, water scarcity concerns,
and, in some cases, regulatory sticks235 have led more
hydraulic fracturing process is usually managed and disposed of in one of three
ways,” including underground injection, delivery to water treatment facilities (or
treatment followed by surface discharge), and reuse and recycling).
229. Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/
27gas.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
230. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r, to Michael Krancer,
Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://
www.epa.gov/region3/marcellus_shale/PADEP_Marcellus_Shale_030711.pdf.
231. Letter from Michael Krancer, Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to
Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r (Apr. 6, 2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/Shawn_Garvin_Letter-April_6_
2011.pdf.
232. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r, to Michael Krancer,
Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/pdf/letter/krancer-letter5-12-11.pdf.
233. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information
from Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal
(May 12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/
4816775AD0E881AB8525788E006A91ED.
234. See Commnwlth. of Penn., DEP Calls on Natural Gas Drillers to Stop
Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=%2017071%20&typei
d=1.
235. See 25 PA. CODE § 95.10 (2011) (requiring that a wastewater source
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operators to move toward flowback reuse and recycling—a
promising but not yet fully developed technique.236 Recycling
appears to be most common in Pennsylvania,237 where the
state has strongly encouraged it, but several pilot projects also
have emerged in Texas.238 Until recycling is perfected and
becomes more affordable, the risks associated with flowback
disposal will continue.
b.

Responses: Minor Revisions of On-Site
Storage Requirements and Encouraging
Flowback Recycling

Depending on the chemicals used in fracturing, flowback
water may contain low concentrations of toxic chemicals and,
as described above, may also have naturally occurring levels of
chlorides and radioactive substances.239 For most industries,
the handling, transport, and disposal of hazardous wastes is
regulated under Subtitle C of the federal Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).240 Most high-volume
wastes from oil and gas drilling and fracturing, called
“exploration and production” or E&P wastes,241 are exempted
reduction strategy “identify the methods and procedures the operator shall use to
maximize the recycling and reuse of flow back or production fluid either to
fracture other natural gas wells, or for other beneficial uses”).
236. AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 22 (explaining that many other
treatment and recycling approaches “are being developed and modified to address
the specific treatment of needs of flow back water in different operating regions”).
237. Stephen Rassenfoss, From Flowback to Fracturing: Water Recycling
Grows in the Marcellus Shale, 63 J. PETROL. TECH. 48, 48 (July 2011), www.spe.
org/jpt/print/archives/2011/07/12Marcellus.pdf (noting that “[i]n Pennsylvania,
recycling wastewater from wells in the Marcellus Shale has been transformed
from a trend to an essential skill” and that in April 2011, “two-thirds of the water
from fracturing was recycled in Pennsylvania”).
238. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (describing Railroad
Commission authorizations of recycling pilot projects in the Barnett Shale).
239. See AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 17 (noting that “[g]as wells can
bring NORM [natrually occuring radioactive materials] to the surface in the
cuttings, flow back fluid, and production brine” and that flow back can range from
brackish to saline to “supersaturated brine”).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (2010) (requiring standards for hazardous waste
generators); 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (2011) (requiring standards for hazardous waste
transporters); 42 U.S.C. § 6922(c) (2010) (requiring standards for operators of
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities).
241. For examples of the exempt E&P wastes, see STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT.
GAS ENVTL. REGS., STATE REVIEW GUIDELINES 12–14, available at http://
67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02/downloads/Revised%20guidelines.pdf
(including drill cuttings, rig wash, drilling fluids, and well completion, treatment,
and stimulation fluids, among others) (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).
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from this provision242 despite sometimes having hazardous
characteristics.243
When the EPA omitted most oil and gas E&P wastes from
RCRA Subtitle C regulation, it noted that in some cases, state
controls were inadequate.244 It therefore required the
development of a voluntary state review, which has since
morphed into a program called the State Review of Oil &
Natural Gas Environmental Regulations (“STRONGER”).245
STRONGER is a partnership between industry, environmental
groups, and state regulators, which has developed guidelines
for better management and disposal of oil and gas wastes.246 It
asks states to voluntarily agree to reviews of their oil and gas
regulations, in which STRONGER suggests how state
programs could better comport with the guidelines.247 The
process is wholly voluntary; if states choose to be reviewed,
they may accept or reject the suggestions as they wish.248
As fracturing has introduced new chemicals to the oil and
gas development process, STRONGER has developed hydraulic
fracturing guidelines and has completed several reviews of
state hydraulic fracturing regulations,249 some of which are
242. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446–47 (July 6, 1988).
243. Id. at 25,454–56. For an in-depth description of the exemption, see James
R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA’s Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous
Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2003);
Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 229, 243–47 (2010).
244. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration,
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,455–56.
245. Id. at 25,456.
246. STATE REV. OF OIL AND NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., GUIDELINES FOR THE
REVIEW OF STATE OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY PROGRAMS
§ 2.6 (June 2000) available at http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02/
downloads/Revised%20guidelines.pdf; Memorandum from the State Rev. of Oil
and Nat. Gas Envtl. Regs. Bd. to Persons Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing
Guidelines, Update on the Development of Hydraulic Fracturing Guidelines (Feb.
8, 2010), http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20pos
ting.pdf.
247. See What Is the State Review Process?, STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS
ENVTL. REGS., http://www.strongerinc.org/ (Oct. 27, 2012) (explaining that team
members “review state oil and gas waste management programs against a set of
guidelines”).
248. Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil From Water—The History of State
Regulation, ENVTL. & ENERGY PUBL’G, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
2011/12/14/1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (noting that the review process is
voluntary and that “STRONGER hasn’t conducted a full review of a state
regulatory program since 2007”).
249. See Past Reviews, STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS.,
http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews (last visited Oct. 27, 2012) (showing
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more thorough than others.250 The reviews are therefore
valuable but fail to comprehensively address gaps in state
regulation. Further, the STRONGER guidelines are
suggestions only,251 and they do not cover all phases of the
tight oil or gas development process.252 Some of the guidelines
focus on procedure, not substance, encouraging state agencies
to require that operators notify them prior to fracturing and to
disclose chemicals to them.253 While ensuring that agencies
have opportunities to monitor shale gas and oil development is
important, the guidelines may not sufficiently address the
many substantive risks at all stages of well development.
Some states—with or without STRONGER’s prodding—
have begun to update regulations addressing the transfer,
storage, and disposal of fracturing wastes. Arkansas, for
example, requires transporters of flowback water to obtain a
permit (renewed annually), carry a visible permit sticker, and
provide emergency telephone numbers, among other
where hydraulic fracturing reviews have been completed).
250. See STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., ARKANSAS HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2012), http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02
/downloads/Arkansas%20HF%20Review%202-2012.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT.
GAS ENVTL. REGS., COLORADO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011),
http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Colorado%20HF%20Review%202011.pdf;
STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., LOUISIANA HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%
20Louisiana%20HF%20Review%203-2011.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS
ENVTL. REGS., OHIO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011),
http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%202011%20OH%20
HF%20Review.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., OKLAHOMA
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), http://www.strongerinc.org/doc
uments/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF%20Review%201-19-2011.pdf; STATE
REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
STATE REVIEW (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/071311_str
onger_pa_hf_review.pdf (showing reports of varying length and detail, which
conclude, for example, in the case of Oklahoma, that regulations are
comprehensive even though they do not address issues such as whether casing
may be reused).
251. Memorandum from the State Rev. of Oil & Nat. Gas Envtl. Regs Board,
supra note 246 (explaining that the guidelines do not set “prescriptive regulatory
standards for states”).
252. See id. (pointing operators to existing STRONGER guidelines for surface
control of waste and waste and wastewater management, and proposing sufficient
staffing, dissemination of educational information—particularly in areas where
high-volume fracturing has not occurred in the past—notification of agency staff
prior to fracturing, and “standards for casing and cementing” that will “meet
anticipated pressures” on the well).
253. STATE REV. OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGS., HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING GUIDELINES § X.2.2 (Jan. 10, 2010), http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/
themes/stronger02/downloads/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20posting.pdf.
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requirements for safe transport.254 New York has proposed to
require that flowback water be stored in steel tanks with
secondary containment and that it be disposed of through
wastewater treatment plants.255 Also at the disposal stage,
Pennsylvania is aggressively pushing for wastewater
recycling256 and requires each operator to develop a
“wastewater source reduction strategy.”257 Operators in West
Virginia similarly must indicate on their well permit
application how they plan to dispose of fracturing wastes,258
and operators must take steps to prohibit disposal of their
flowback waste through a publicly owned treatment works
unless the Department of Environmental Protection approves
this disposal method.259 Oklahoma, on the other hand, has
updated its regulations only to tell operators which existing oil
and gas regulations apply to fracturing and fracturing wastes,
with the exception of required chemical disclosure.260 Many
states have, surprisingly, failed even to do this.261 In some
cases it is therefore not clear whether flowback water may be
stored in an unlined pit or not and how it must be disposed
of.262
254. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-17(g) (2012); ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N
RULE E-3(d) (2012).
255. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-39, 7-63.
256. See 25 PA. CODE § 95.10 (Westlaw 2012) (requiring a wastewater source
reduction strategy that identifies “the methods and procedures the operator shall
use to maximize the recycling and reuse of flow back or production fluid”).
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., GENE C. SMITH, W. VA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., OFF. OF OIL & GAS,
PERMITTING OVERVIEW
4 (Feb. 2012), http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-andgas/Horizontal-Permits/Horizontal%20Well%20Permit%20Packet/Documents/Wor
kshop%20Presentations/Permitting.pdf (requiring an operator, in an application
for horizontal drilling, to describe the “[m]ethod of management and disposal of
produced and flow-back water”).
259. W. Va. Exec. Order No. 4-11 (July 12, 2011), available at
http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/98484.
260. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-24(b)(3) (2011).
261. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1001 (2011) (requiring only “suitable and
safe” surface casing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17 (2012) (in casing
requirements, failing to account for increased pressure that may be placed on
casing as a result of fracturing); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (in the
regulatory definition of regulated pits, failing to specify which pits are used to
store flowback water and how these pits must be lined, if at all, although
including a definition of “disposal pit,” which likely collects flowback).
262. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (stating that pits for
flowback likely fall within the “[c]ollecting pit” category, which is a “[p]it used for
storage of saltwater or other oil and gas wastes prior to disposal at a disposal well
or fluid injection well,” and for which permits are required. This could be clarified,
however, by directly referring to flowback); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.407 (2012)
(in a regulation that appears to require tanks for flowback, providing that “only
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As briefly introduced in Part I.A.3 above, the disposal of
flowback water has not only caught the attention of state
regulators, but also of the federal EPA.263 After The New York
Times expressed concerns about wastewater treatment,264 the
EPA took note and has since become more involved in
wastewater disposal. It has requested that the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection ensure that
wastewater treatment plants are not violating their existing
CWA permits,265 and it has announced that it will impose
Clean Water Act treatment standards on wastewater from
coalbed methane wells in 2013 and shale gas wells in 2014.266
Regional regulatory bodies also have taken note. The Delaware
River Basin Commission has proposed that flowback water
must be disposed of through wastewater treatment plants
either within or outside the basin; the Commission proposes
that the plants must certify that they are able to accept the
water and adequately treat it.267 Texas, in turn, has approved
several wastewater treatment plants to accept produced water
(but not flowback) and has encouraged pilot projects to test
flowback treatment and recycling.268
The large quantities of new wastewater produced by
fracturing continue to pose substantial environmental
challenges. EPA draft standards for treating wastewater from
fractured shale gas wells will not be implemented until 2014.269
In the meantime, there is a risk that in regions with limited
underground injection capacity, wastewater treatment plants
operating under old CWA permits might accept, and
inadequately treat, millions of gallons of flowback water before
discharging it into surface waters.270
the following materials may be placed in a lined pit” and does not include
flowback water or completion fluids in the list of acceptable materials).
263. See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin (Mar. 7, 2011), supra note 230, at 1
(expressing concerns about wastewater that may contain materials damaging to
human health and the environment); Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
supra note 233 (describing EPA requests for disposal information from fracturing
companies).
264. See Urbina, supra note 229 (expressing concerns that wastewaters with
low levels of radiation were being released into rivers).
265. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin (Mar. 7, 2011), supra note 230, at 2.
266. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 116, at 1.
267. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 61–62.
268. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6.
269. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 116, at 1.
270. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Clean Water Action and Three Rivers
Waterkeeper v. Municipal Authority of the City of Mckeesport, No. 11CV00940,
2011 WL 2883571 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2011) (alleging that a wastewater treatment
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Finally, disposal of flowback in underground injection
wells could cause small earthquakes271 or pollute aquifers.272
These potential disposal risks have not been sufficiently
addressed in some states, as discussed in Part III.B.2 below.
3.

Withdrawing More Water

Perhaps the most dramatic change introduced by
slickwater fracturing is the quantity of water used for well
development. Operators have long used water as a component
of drilling fluid and mud, but this consumption pales in
comparison to the millions of gallons of water withdrawn for
each fracture job, or “treatment,” as it is often called.273 Many
operators drive tanker trucks to surface waters, insert a large
hose into the water, pump water into the truck, and drive it to
the well site or centralized impoundment.274 Alternatively,
operators build a new water pipeline from a stream or
aquifer275 to the site or tap into an existing one—or drill a
water well at the well site.276 The risks associated with
heightened water use, and certain responses, are briefly
described in this Section.
a.

Risks: Water Quantity and Quality Impacts

More water withdrawals of larger quantities of water
plant accepted “oil and gas drilling wastewater without the capacity to treat it
before discharging the wastewater into the Monongahela River”); Urbina, supra
note 229; Letter from Shawm M. Garvin (May 12, 2011), supra note 232; Press
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 233.
271. See infra note 385.
272. See infra note 384.
273. See Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59 (explaining that
“[e]xtracting natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation requires . . . a
process known as ‘hydraulic fracturing’ that uses far greater amounts of water
than traditional natural gas exploration”).
274. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-2.
275. Id. (“Water for hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it
from surface water bodies or new or existing water-supply wells drilled into
aquifers”). A website developed and maintained by industry and the Ground
Water Protection Council suggests that “[m]ost water used in hydraulic fracturing
comes from surface water sources such as lakes, rivers and municipal supplies”
but notes some groundwater use. Hydraulic Fracturing Water Usage, FRACFOCUS
CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY (Nov. 13, 2011) http://fracfocus.org/waterprotection/hydraulic-fracturing-usage.
276. Site visit by the author to an Oklahoma well site (Oct. 28, 2011) (The
operator showed the author and students a water well that he had drilled for the
fracturing operation, with permission of the surface owner).
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introduce several environmental risks. Hoses used to pump
water out of surface supplies can transfer invasive species
between water sources.277 Withdrawing larger quantities of
water can cause surface water temperatures and pollutant
concentrations to increase (when new pollutants are added to
smaller water volumes), thus impacting aquatic plants and
wildlife and reducing water quality for all water users—not
just oil and gas companies.278 Lower flow conditions in surface
waters can also lower the oxygen content of water, which
negatively affects certain species.279 Finally, water
withdrawals for fracturing can, of course, reduce the amount of
water available from underground sources. The Railroad
Commission of Texas, for example, estimates that 7 to 13
percent of groundwater withdrawals in the Barnett Shale area
will be for fracturing by 2025, which could disproportionately
impact rural areas that tend to rely on groundwater for their
water supply.280 Because fractured wells often are concentrated
in highly productive or easily accessible portions of the shale,281
water withdrawals can be similarly concentrated, thus having
potentially powerful collective impacts.282 Unfortunately, as
described in the following Section, states have not fully
addressed these impacts.
b.

Responses: Monitoring Water Withdrawals
and Implementing Some Substantive Limits

States have historically controlled water use, and their
primary reaction to oil and gas operators’ consumption283 of
277. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:1204 (2012) (requiring disinfection of hoses and
water transportation tanks in cutthroat trout habitat).
278. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-2
(summarizing the “[p]otential effects of reduced stream flow,” including
“insufficient supplies for downstream uses,” “adverse impacts to quantity and
quality of” habitats, “unsuitable water temperature and dissolved oxygen
concentrations,” and “degraded” water quality).
279. See id.
280. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6.
281. See, e.g., Pennsylvania 2010 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 6 (showing
Marcellus Shale wells as being concentrated in portions of the state); Barnett
Shale Information, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.rrc.
state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php (describing the “core” counties for Barnett
drilling).
282. See DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 20 (noting “potential
streamflow and assimilative capacity impacts affected by the quantity, location,
timing and manner” of withdrawals for fracturing).
283. Thomas W. Beauduy, “Shale” We Drill? The Legal and Environmental
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millions of gallons of water to drill and fracture new wells has
been to monitor this use. West Virginia, for example, requires
that operators applying for a permit report the volume of water
that they anticipate using and its source,284 although it
recently added substantive limitations on withdrawals.285
Texas’s Railroad Commission similarly mandates reporting of
actual quantities of water used at each well.286
Other states and regional bodies have already moved
beyond monitoring, recognizing that withdrawals of water from
surface and underground sources could lower available water
supply and affect water quality.287 New York requires
permitting for surface water withdrawals and has proposed to
prevent operators from degrading water quality as a result of
water withdrawal.288 Maryland requires a water appropriation
and use permit for all surface and groundwater withdrawals.289
Operators in Pennsylvania must submit a detailed water
management plan to the state.290 Michigan prohibits the use of
surface water for drilling fluid unless there is an emergency
but does not appear to similarly bar the use of surface water in
fracturing.291 The Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin
Commissions—two regional bodies operating under interstate
compacts—have implemented some of the most stringent
provisions for water withdrawals for fracturing. The DRBC
would prohibit any alteration of flow that would impair a fresh
surface water body’s best designated use (such as use for
drinking water) and would bar all withdrawals that caused
surface waters to dip below certain “pass-by flow” quantities,
Impacts of Extracting Natural Gas from Marcellus Shale, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
189, 217 (2011) (noting that “one hundred percent of the water that goes down the
bore hole is considered lost to the basin”).
284. W. VA. CODE §§ 22-26-2 to -3 (2012).
285. Id. § 22-6A-7(e) (2012) (requiring a water management plan if more than
210,000 gallons will be used in any thirty-day period, including, among other
provisions, a demonstration that sufficient instream flow will be available
immediately downstream of the water withdrawal point).
286. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (explaining that the
Commission requires reporting).
287. For a more in-depth discussion of substantive limits, see WISEMAN &
GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 71–82.
288. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-2 to -5.
289. MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T., APPLICATION FOR GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION 7 (2008), http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/permit/MDELMA-PER045.pdf.
290. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 256, at 1; 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3211 (2012).
291. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.404 (2011).
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defined by the volume of water flowing by a point in a stream
over a certain period of time.292 The SRBC similarly requires
permits for water withdrawals for fracturing and well
development and the maintenance of certain stream flows
when surface waters are withdrawn.293
Although some regulatory bodies have begun to address
increased water withdrawals through monitoring and/or
controlling use—and the EPA has promised to study the
issue294—more attention is needed in some regions,
particularly as droughts plague areas experiencing a fracturing
boom.295
In sum, slickwater hydraulic fracturing, in consuming vast
quantities of water, requiring new chemicals, and producing
more wastes, has introduced a range of new risks to the oil and
gas development process. As well numbers have risen, longknown impacts of oil and gas development also have grown.
These familiar risks (now expanded) often are ignored in policy
and regulatory debates. Part III.B. describes these risks and
the limited attention that they have received in political and
regulatory circles.
B.

The Expansion of Oil and Gas Development in Certain
Regions

Many of the core risks of fracturing appear to arise not
from the technology itself but from the enhanced oil and gas
drilling activity that it inspires in certain areas—activity that
has long occurred but has changed in scale. Some regulators
and policymakers have, at least sporadically, responded to the
new stages of well development introduced by fracturing; some
of these responses have at least indirectly recognized that more
fracturing leads to more well development and thus higher
risks.296 Some states have made or proposed comprehensive
292. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 54.
293. Review and Approval of Projects, Susquehanna River Basin Commission,
73 Fed. Reg. 78618, 78620 (Dec. 23, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 806.23).
294. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY., EPA/600/R-11/122, supra note 36, at xi.
295. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6; see also NAT’L DROUGHT
MITIGATION CTR., U.S. Drought Monitor: Texas, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/
DM_state.htm?TX,S (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (showing relatively severe drought
in the Barnett Shale area).
296. See, e.g., H.B. 401, § 22-6A-2, 2011 Leg. (W. Va. 2011), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2011_SESSIONS/4X/Bills/hb401%2
0enr.htm (noting that both new and old practices, including hydraulic fracturing,
have “resulted in a new type and scale of natural gas development” and that
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revisions of their oil and gas codes as fracturing and drilling
have increased—thus recognizing both fracturing and the
uptick in traditional well development. Colorado,297 New
York,298 Pennsylvania,299 and West Virginia300 have been
leaders in this area. For the most part, though, states have
failed to make several needed changes.
This Part describes the stages of well development that are
necessary for both conventional and fractured wells and
explores how the familiar risks of these development stages
expand as fracturing enables well numbers to grow. After
identifying the potential risks associated with methane leakage
during drilling, handling and disposal of more wastes,
increased soil erosion, and spills from drilling equipment on
site, it explores how, if at all, states have responded to these
problems associated with enhanced drilling activity.
1.

Drilling, Casing, and Cementing More Wells

One of the most important stages of well development
involves the casing or “lining” of a well to prevent fossil fuels
flowing through the well from mixing with underground water
and other underground resources.301 Operators cement this
casing in place to secure it within the well.302 If casing and
cementing fail, methane—or potentially sediment—can escape
and pollute nearby resources. As this Section discusses, some
states have updated gas well casing requirements and
mandates for blowout equipment, which can help control and
prevent pressure build-up in the well. Others, however, have
not addressed the risks posed by higher drilling rates.

“[e]xisting laws and regulations developed for conventional oil and gas operations
do not adequately address these new technologies and practices”).
297. COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, COGCC
AMENDED RULES REDLINE, http://cogcc.state.co.us/ (follow “Rules” hyperlink in
blue menu to the left of the page, then follow “2008 Rulemaking” hyperlink, then
follow “COGCC Amended Rules Redline”) (showing revisions to portions of
Colorado’s oil and gas regulations).
298. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31 (comprehensively
examining risks and, in chapter 7, proposing many conditions to address these
risks at each stage of the development process).
299. H.R. 1950, 2012 Sess. (Pa. 2012); infra notes 326–327 (showing additional
Pennsylvania rulemakings).
300. H.R. 401, § 22-6A-2, 2011 Leg. (W. Va. 2011).
301. GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 110, at 51–52.
302. Id. at 52.
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Risks: Methane Migration from Improperly
Cased Wells, Well Blowouts, and Future Well
Failure

As operators drill thousands of new wells prior to
fracturing them, each new well threatens to pollute
underground soil and water resources if not properly lined and
cased. Fracturing further heightens the need for proper well
casing because fracturing places more pressure on the
wellbore.303 Well casing can fail while the well is being drilled
or fractured as a result of the installation of used, weak casing
or insufficient cementing or, in some cases, when an
underground blowout occurs, which is an “uncontrolled flow of
formation fluids from a high pressure zone into a lower
pressure zone.”304 Casing and well integrity also can be
compromised long after the well has stopped producing and has
been plugged—again as a result of weak or insufficient casing
or cementing.305 When casing fails, gas or other substances can
pollute drinking water wells and other underground and
surface resources.306 Methane also occurs naturally
underground and may pollute improperly constructed water
wells in the absence of any oil or gas drilling activity.307
Enhanced drilling activity, accompanied by the improper
303. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, http://cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_
Topics/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Frequent_Questions_about_Hydraulic%20Fracturin
g.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (noting that “[h]ydraulic fracturing involves
injection pressures that exceed those of the geologic formation”).
304. Special Kick Problems and Procedures, SERENE ENERGY, http://www.
sereneenergy.org/Special-Kicks-Problems--and--Procedure.php (last visited Nov.
3, 2012).
305. See Richard J. Davies, Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Caused
by Hydraulic Fracturing Remains Unproven, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI. (Oct. 25, 2011), www.pnas.org/content/108/43/E871.full.pdf (noting
the many improperly plugged, old wells in Pennsylvania that could be leaking
methane).
306. See, e.g., infra note 307 (describing the East Resources casing failure that
contributed to a methane release, which entered the subsurface and sent methane
to nearby springs and a well).
307. See, e.g., EAST RESOURCES, INC., DELCIOTTO NO. 2, SUBSURFACE NATURAL
GAS RELEASE REPORT ROARING BRANCH, MCNETT TWP., LYCOMING CNTY., PA. 1011 (Sept. 18, 2009) (on file with author). This report was obtained in an October 7,
2011, response to Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170 submitted by the author. In
an incident where a water well and several other water sources were
contaminated with methane, the report noted that “[c]oncentrations of gas in
several receptors identified during the investigation” were from historical stray
gas.” Id.; Davies, supra note 305 (noting that “natural seepage of methane in
Pennsylvania is common”).
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plugging and casing of wells, however, might increase the risk
of water contamination with methane.308
A number of well, spring, and stream contamination
incidents in Pennsylvania—which may be linked to gas
drilling—illuminate the potential for underground gas to
migrate to water sources from improperly cased wells,309
suggesting that drilling, not fracturing, may be one of the core
culprits. A draft report of methane contamination in
Pennsylvania preliminarily concludes that both newly drilled
and old wells that were improperly cased have caused methane
contamination of water, as has naturally occurring stray gas
that migrated underground and into poorly constructed water
wells.310 In McNett Township, for example, the state
Department of Environmental Protection believes that an
improperly cased new gas well caused gas to leak from the
well,311 thus forcing “one resident to evacuate her home” and
contaminating “multiple private drinking water wells and two
tributaries of Lycoming Creek.”312 Several sources support the
conclusion that improper casing of a drilled (not fractured) well
at least partially caused a release of gas into nearby water in
McNett.313 A report conducted by the well operator concluded
that the gas release “resulted in sediment and gas migration
into streams, groundwater wells, springs, culverts, and a
308. See infra notes 310–317.
309. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 52–53 n.230 (listing gas
migration incidents and “Section 208” letters from the Department of
Environmental Protection to landowners, which concluded that the Department
believed that methane contamination was associated with natural gas activity.
Note, however, that the rebuttable presumption of contamination in Pennsylvania
may have influenced these DEP conclusions).
310. See PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.dep.state.
pa.us/dep/subject/advcoun/oil_gas/2009/Stray%20Gas%20Migration%20Cases.pdf
(describing a number of pre-2008 cases, which preceded the Marcellus boom
beginning in 2008); Pennsylvania 2008 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 19
(showing that drilling in the Marcellus began to expand in 2008); see also EAST
RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307 (describing both naturally occurring gas and gas
from a drilled well as contributing to the gas located in wells and creeks).
311. It is not clear whether this well was actually drilled in the Marcellus
Shale, where fracturing is consistently used, and it is important to note that the
incident likely occurred during drilling, not fracturing. PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL.
PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS,
supra note 310.
312. PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 310.
313. See EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 10; Letter from Caleb
Woolever, Geologic Trainee, Oil & Gas Mgmt., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to
Matthew Carpenter (Dec. 4, 2009) (on file with author).
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residential structure.”314 The report further concluded that
improper casing of one well caused the gas release,315 although
“historical stray gas” from “existing subsurface conditions” also
caused some of the contamination of water.316 The DEP notified
several nearby property owners that stream and water well
contamination was “caused by failure in a nearby natural gas
well” and recommended that the residents not drink the
water.317 A settlement between DEP and the well operator also
noted that the operator allowed natural gas to enter a
freshwater spring and creek tributaries.318
A recent draft article, forthcoming in the Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, suggests that fracturing, not
just drilling, may be connected to methane contamination of
water wells in Pennsylvania319—thus fueling320 the fire of the
existing nationwide policy debate over contamination. The
authors conclude that thermogenic gas, which is typically
found in deep formations, such as shales, has migrated to
underground sources of drinking water and that a higher
percentage of water wells in active drilling and fracturing
areas contain methane than do wells in inactive areas.321
Although the authors implicate fracturing, not just well
drilling, they conclude that more research is needed to confirm
this alleged connection.322 Other authors have disputed the
findings presented in the article.323

314. EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 1.
315. Id. at 10 (reporting that “ERI believes the source of the natural gas
released to the subsurface was from the Delciotto No. 2 (well) annular space
between the 7-inch production casing and the open hole”).
316. Id. at 10–11.
317. Letter from Caleb Woolever (Dec. 4, 2009), supra note 313; Letter from
Caleb Woolever, Geologic Trainee, Oil & Gas Mgmt., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to
Allyn Leonard (Dec. 4, 2009) (obtained from Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170
and on file with author).
318. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., In the Matter of: East Resources, Inc., Permit
081-20130 Delciotto 2 McNett, Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty at 6 (Apr. 19,
2011) (obtained from Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170 and on file with author).
319. Supra note 309.
320. Osborn et al., supra note 33, at 8173–76.
321. Id. at 2.
322. Id. at 4–5.
323. See, e.g., Samuel C. Schon, Hydraulic Fracturing Not Responsible for
Methane Migration, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., Sept. 13,
2011, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3174578/;
Davies, supra note 305.
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Responses: Requiring Better Casing and
Cementing, and Preventing Blowouts

While drilling with improper casing has been proven to
cause stray gas migration, the media, environmental groups,
and members of Congress have continued to investigate
potential connections between fracturing and methane
contamination. On one side of the debate, a steady stream of
testimony from state regulators has certified that fracturing
has never caused contamination,324 while environmental
groups list dozens of likely contamination events.325
As the fracturing-methane migration debate has continued
to unfold, states have implemented and enforced existing
casing and cementing regulations that apply to the drilling
process and, in some cases, updated these regulations as more
wells are drilled and fractured.326 In limited cases, states have
also updated some regulations to avoid blowouts (pressure or
fluid build-ups in the well that cause it to “explode”) and to
require that wells be more thoroughly plugged after production
ends.327
Typical state casing regulations require that casing be of a
certain strength (either a narrative standard, such as
“suitable”328 casing or a technical requirement, such as “new
steel casing” of a certain grade329); that the cement used to

324. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In many cases, investigations
did not occur sufficiently soon after fracturing to prove or deny these claims. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 6–11.
326. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS . COMM’N RULE B-19(g) (2012) (showing updated
casing requirements); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(o) (2012) (showing
updated cement bond log requirement); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-21 (2012)
(showing updated cementing requirements); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1
(2012) (showing updated casing test requirements); PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED
RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (c) (July 10, 2010), http://www.pabulletin.com/
secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (showing updated requirements for setting of
casing).
327. See, e.g., PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.93
(July 10, 2012), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html.
328. E.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1106(1) (2011).
329. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-19(d) (2012) (requiring steel
alloy casing that will withstand a certain pressure); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-0321 (2012) (requiring new or reconditioned pipe tested to withstand a certain
pressure); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 18, at 7-50
(2011) (requiring new casing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17(A) (2011)
(requiring steel production casing); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b)(1)(A) (2010)
(requiring used steel casing to be tested to a certain pressure).
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secure the casing in the well be of a certain strength;330 that
the cement be allowed to set for a certain amount of time and
up to a certain compressive strength before being disturbed by
drilling or testing;331 that the casing extend a certain number
of feet below the lowest fresh groundwater;332 and that
operators submit cementing logs to show how they have cased
and cemented a well.333
330. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(h) (2011) (requiring casing to
meet a certain pressure test after a certain number of hours at a designated
temperature); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.10(P) (2011) (requiring cement to meet
an American Petroleum institute standard (meaning that it may not contain more
than three percent calcium chloride) and minimum cement setting time); MONT.
ADMIN. R. 36.22.1001(2) (2011) (requiring cement to set until it has reached a
minimum pounds per square inch (PSI) level); N.M. CODE R. § 19.156.16.10(G)(2)
(LexisNexis 2011) (requiring cement to set until it has a compressive strength of
500 psi); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-53 (also
proposing to require 500 psi); 25 PA. CODE § 78.85 (2011) (requiring “cement that
meets or exceeds the ASTM International C 150, Type I, II or III Standard or API
Specification 10”).
331. See supra note 330 (describing both cement strength and set times in
certain state regulations).
332. See Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Order No. 146-2005-09, Cove Creek Field, at
7 (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field%20Rules/Fayetteville%
20Shale/146-2005-09.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Griffin Mountain Field,
Amendment 7 (July 26, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field%20Rules/
Fayetteville%20Shale/114-2005-07.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Gravel Hill Field,
Order No. 97-2005-06, 7 (June 28, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field%
20Rules/Fayetteville%20Shale/97-2005-06.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Scotland
Field, Order No. 96-2005-06, 7 (June 28, 20062005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/
Field%20Rules/Fayetteville%20Shale/96-2005-06.pdf (requiring at least 500 feet
of surface casing in all Fayetteville Shale fields); MD. CODE REGS.
26.19.01.10(O)(4) (requiring casing 100 feet deep or below the deepest known
workable coal, whichever is deeper); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 324.408(1) (2011)
(requiring casing 100 feet below all freshwater strata); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-50 (proposing to require casing seventy fivefeet deep or into bedrock, whichever is deeper); STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS
ENVTL. REGS., OHIO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 11 (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/oil/pdf/stronger_review11.pdf
(indicating that Ohio has a fifty-foot depth requirement); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1509.17(D) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that agency-specific review of casing is
not required if casing is at least 500 feet deep); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-34(c)(1) (requiring fifty-foot casing or casing that is ninety feet below the surface,
whichever is deeper); 25 PA. CODE § 78.83(c) (2011) (requiring casing that is fifty
feet deep or into consolidated rock, whichever is deeper); W. VA. DEP’T ENVTL.
PROT., CASING AND CEMENTING STANDARDS 2, http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-andgas/Documents/Casing%20and%20Cementing%20Standards.pdf (last visited Oct.
28, 2012) (requiring casing to be between fifty and one hundred feet below the
lowest fresh groundwater).
333. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-19(f) (2012) (if cementing fails
to isolate hydraulic fracturing zone, bond log or “other cement evaluation tool”
required); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.418(a) (2011) (requiring log); N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-54 (proposing to require log); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17(D) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring log for “each cemented
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Protections against well blowouts typically either broadly
require the use of blowout preventers (“BOPs”)334 or specify the
types of BOP equipment that must be used,335 including, for
example, BOPs with certain types of equipment336 and a
remote control capability.337 Plugging regulations—which
follow drilling, casing, and production of oil or gas—require
operators to post bonds, which are forfeited and used by the
state to plug a well if the operator fails to do so herself.338 They
also require that operators use a certain type of cement and
cement-application method to ensure proper plugging.339
The states that have updated their regulations in
recognition of the rise of oil and gas development and
fracturing have largely focused on casing—requiring that
casing be extended farther below groundwater, be pressure
tested to ensure that it will withstand fracturing, and use
stronger cement.340 Several states have also modified blowout
string of casing”); 3 WYO. CODE §§ 12, 21(a) (LexisNexis 20121) (requiring well log
and report on well completion).
334. But see 805 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:020 (2011) (only requiring BOPs “[i]n
areas where abnormal pressures are expected or encountered”).
335. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-41(V) (2012), http://www.aogc
.state.ar.us/onlinedata/forms/rules%20and%20regulations.pdf (requiring BOPs
and regular BOP testing); COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(a) (2011) (requiring
BOP equipment to exceed the maximum surface pressure to which it will be
subjected); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 42, Pt. XIX § 111(C) (2011) (requiring installation
of BOP); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.10(Q) (2011) (requiring installation of BOP);
MONTANA ADMIN. R. § 36.22.1014 (2011) (requiring installation of BOP with
specific parameters); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 738 (requiring BOP to be maintained and in working order); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1509.17(A) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring casing to provide base for BOP and
other equipment necessary to control well); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-29-1(a)
(2011) (requiring installation of BOP with specific parameters); 25 PA. CODE §
78.72 (2011) (requiring BOP for all wells in the Marcellus Shale).
336. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(e)(4) (requiring blind ram)
(2011); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.406(1)(a) (2011) (same).
337. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.406(1)(b) (2011) (requiring
“[a]ccessible controls on rig floor and at a safe remote location”); MONT. ADMIN. R.
36.22.1014(7)(c) (2011) (requiring remote controls of BOP equipment).
338. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(d)(1) (“Wells shall be plugged to
insure that all formations bearing usable quality water, oil, gas, or geothermal
resources are protected.”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(f) (“Operators shall submit
required financial security or well-specific plugging insurance policies at the time
of filing an initial organization report, as a condition of the issuance of a permit to
drill, recomplete or reenter, upon yearly renewal, or as otherwise required under
this section.”).
339. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(d) (2012) (“All cementing operations
during plugging shall be performed under the direct supervision of the operator or
his authorized representative . . . . Cement plugs shall be set to isolate each
productive horizon and usable quality water strata.”).
340. PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78 (July 10, 2010),
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prevention requirements to ensure that BOPs are installed and
used during drilling and fracturing.341 Casing and BOP
requirements still vary substantially, however. Arkansas,
Maryland, and Michigan appear to require the deepest surface
casing,342 while Kentucky only requires that the casing extend
thirty feet below groundwater.343 Others simply require
“sufficient”344 casing, with individual requirements for well
casing varying by well. Texas has proposed, but not yet
finalized, new rules that would include more stringent casing
and cementing requirements.345
Even in those states that have expanded casing and
blowout prevention regulations, legislatures and agencies have
generally omitted a key regulatory component that will be
essential in an updated policy dialogue. States need
information on the quality of water near well sites prior to
drilling and fracturing—the baseline quality.346 If states know
existing concentrations of pollutants in waters near proposed
wells, they can attempt to trace any additional pollutants postdrilling and fracturing either to oil and gas wells or to natural
sources.347 Isotopic analysis of gas within the well annulus (the
space between the well bore and the casing), for example, may
show that the gas that escaped from the well is similar to the
gas that entered the water.348 Alternatively, the gas in

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (regulations codified
at 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (2011)); 25 PA. CODE § 78.72(k) (2012) (updating
cementing requirements).
341. See, e.g., N.D. DEP’T OF MINERAL RES., PROPOSED 2012 RULE CHANGES,
GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, 43-02-03-27.1, (Nov. 9, 2011), available at
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/rules2012changes.pdf
(showing
updates
for
pressure release valves and blowout equipment required); PA. BULLETIN,
PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.72, 78.84 (July 10, 2010), http://www.
pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (showing new blowout prevention requirements for Marcellus Shale (unconventional) wells).
342. See supra note 332.
343. 805 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:020.3(1) (2011).
344. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010) (“sufficient surface casing to
protect water”); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(f) (2011) (“manner sufficient to
protect all fresh water”).
345. R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., supra note 101, at 1-11 (proposing improved casing
and cementing requirements, including mechanical integrity tests, better quality
of cement, and avoiding disturbing the well within eight hours after cement is in
place, among other protections).
346. See, e.g., Osborn et al., supra note 33, at 4 (noting chemical comparisons
in water wells with “baseline historical data”).
347. See id.
348. See, e.g., EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 10–11 (describing an
isotopic analysis).
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underground water may exhibit the qualities of historic gas
that has long been in the formation, suggesting that drilling
may not be the culprit.349 Despite the importance of these types
of baseline analyses in determining the sources of water
pollution, many states do not require baseline testing.
A number of states, and at least one regional regulatory
body, have started to address this problem. Colorado requires
baseline surface water testing near certain public water
systems and aquifers.350 Louisiana mandates groundwater
monitoring if a pit is likely to contaminate groundwater.351
Michigan,352 New York,353 Ohio,354 and West Virginia (at the
water well owner’s request)355 all require testing of water wells
within a certain number of feet of a proposed gas well.
Oklahoma, in contrast, appears to only require baseline water
testing around certain underground injection disposal wells.356
Through somewhat more comprehensive rules for
ascertaining water quality problems and their causes,
Pennsylvania strongly encourages357 baseline testing around
all wells by applying a rebuttable presumption that gas
operators have caused water contamination if it occurs within
one year of drilling and within a certain distance of the site.358
West Virginia has a similar rebuttable presumption.359 Finally,
the Delaware River Basin Commission has proposed to require
groundwater and surface water studies prior to the
construction of well sites in the basin watershed.360
Policy efforts to require better water quality information
have been some of the most successful so far, likely because
they do not require difficult substantive changes in industry
practice, aside from potentially expensive monitoring and
reporting. Industry and state legislators alike have similarly
supported chemical disclosure requirements. The many states
349. See id.
350. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:317(b) (Westlaw 2012).
351. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit; 43, pt. XIX, § 309(A) (2011).
352. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1002 (2011).
353. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 1-10.
354. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501:9-1-02(F) (2011) (testing for water wells within
300 feet of the oil and gas well, in urbanized areas); OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.06
(2012) (testing for water wells within 1,500 feet of proposed horizontal wells).
355. W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-19.1 (2011).
356. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-5(b)(5)(C) (2011).
357. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012).
358. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) (Westlaw 2012).
359. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-18(b) (2012).
360. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at § 7.4(e)(4) (2011).
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that support expanded information about chemicals but do not
require baseline testing of underground and surface water
supplies near proposed wells should not overlook the
importance of baseline testing—they should demand baseline
testing along with chemical information. Only with better data
on the pre- and post-drill content of waters can we understand
the causes of alleged contamination, both at and below the
surface.
2.

Producing, Storing, and Disposing of Drilling
Wastes

Heightened drilling activity enabled by fracturing does not
only use more drilling fluids and muds and increase the risk of
casing and cement failures; higher drilling rates also could
generate more waste,361 and thus increase the risks of
improper handling and disposal of these wastes, as discussed in
this Section. Following discussion of these risks, this Section
describes the existing state spill prevention and control laws
that apply to drilling, state efforts to expand requirements to
setback wells and well pads from protected resources and
increase spill containment on well sites, and limited efforts to
address the risks of underground and surface waste disposal.
a.

Risks: Spills and Contamination of Soil and
Surface or Underground Water

The potentially larger volume of drilling wastes generated
by higher rates of drilling362 include used drilling fluids and
muds, drill cuttings (the soil and rock from the drilled
formation), and produced water that comes up naturally out of
the formation.363 Drill cuttings can be contaminated with
drilling fluids and may contain salts and naturally low levels of
radioactive material.364 Produced water, too, tends to have high
salt levels365 and may be slightly radioactive.366 Used drilling
361. Note, however, that horizontal drilling decreases the amount of waste that
otherwise would have been required to produce the same amount of gas from
vertical wells. See supra note 70.
362. But see id.
363. Cf. Dancy, supra note 196 (describing naturally-occurring levels of total
dissolved solids in the water).
364. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-205 (2011).
365. See supra note 197.
366. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-205 (2011).
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fluids and muds (mixed with drill cuttings) are often stored on
site in a reserve pit, and produced water is stored in a pit or
tank.367 Storage pits can leak due to a torn liner, and pits or
tanks may overflow if improperly constructed or maintained,
thus causing spills onto or beyond the well pad.368 In total,
about 64 percent of violations identified at sites with fractured
wells in Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, and Texas were
caused by storage or disposal of oil and gas wastes, although
spills represented a small percentage of total violations in
many states.369
In Ohio, Department of Natural Resources inspectors
noted that the “backside wall” of a drill pit had given way,
“causing the contents to spill down into woods and down to a
creek.”370 In New Mexico, several spills occurred during
transfers of produced water. Twelve barrels of produced water
spilled when a flowline ruptured (ten of which were
recovered),371 and improperly installed piping at a site spilled
twenty-five barrels of produced water.372 Additionally, several
pit or tank overflows, due either to the malfunctioning of a
tank, weather, or improper construction, have caused spills of
as much as 5,964 gallons of produced water, which was only
partially recovered.373 Similarly, produced water in a tank in
Louisiana flowed out of the tank and over a surrounding
retaining wall into a “ditch and swampy area.”374
In addition to overflows and spills during transfers to
tanks or pits, pits can leak into soil or water if they are
367. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:904 (Westlaw 2012) (requiring tank
storage (closed loop systems) when drilling near water supply); LA. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 43, pt. XIX, § .307(A) (2011) (regulating produced water pits); MD. CODE REGS.
26.19.01.10 (J)(4-5) (Westlaw 2012) (regulating pits); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
324.407 (2011) (regulating pits for drilling wastes); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02- 0319.3 (2011) (regulating pits); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501: 9-3-08 (2011) (regulating
pits); 25 PA. CODE § 78.56 (2011) (regulating pits); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §
3.8(d)(4) (regulating pits).
368. See infra notes 369–374.
369. Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations,
supra note 94, at 19.
370. API well no., 34111241810000, violation spreadsheet reference no.
2016754140, Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Resources, May 16, 2008 inspection (violation).
371. Permit no. 30-045-31190, incident no. nBP0719742443, New Mexico Oil
Conservation Div., June 2007 (referred to environmental inspector).
372. Permit no. 30-045-29954, incident no. nBP0625440443, New Mexico Oil
Conservation Div., Aug. 2006.
373. Permit no. 30-039-25947, incident no. nDGF0100955815, New Mexico Oil
Conservation Div., Jan. 8, 2001 (142 barrels (5,964 gallons) of produced water
spilled, seventy barrels were recovered; violation noted, no known enforcement).
374. La. Permit no. 238585, Bossier Parish, Mar. 18, 2009.
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improperly lined or constructed, or if the clay or synthetic liner
is damaged. In New Mexico, a partially-melted liner caused a
leak of five barrels of produced water,375 and several tears in
pit liners have been noted in Pennsylvania—some of which
caused pit contents to leak.376 Louisiana violations similarly
showed that reserve pits, which contain drilling wastes,
contained selenium and other pollutants above acceptable
levels; these led to several orders for remedial action.377
Further, if well sites and pits are not fenced or covered,
animals and humans can come into contact with waste and
chemicals stored in pits or spilled on the surface.378
Several additional risks emerge when the wastes stored in
pits or tanks on site are eventually removed from pits or tanks
and disposed of. Produced water is sometimes disposed of on
roads for dust control,379 while used drilling fluids may be
spread on the surface of the well site (particularly if they are
water, not oil-based),380 and drill cuttings often are reinserted
375. No.Permit no. 30-045-34475, incident no. nRMD1010257007, New Mexico
Oil Conservation Div., June 11 and 18, 2009.
376. Well Permit no. 115-20250, Springville, Susquehanna, Penn. Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection (Jan. 5, 2011) (“Tears in the liner were observed on the well pad
behind baker tanks and heating system. Black fluid was impacting the surface of
the ground due to breached containment.”); Well Permit no. 115-20150, Dimock,
Susquehanna, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Feb. 18, 2011) (noting improperly
lined pit and tears in the liner); Well Permit no. 021-21166, Inspection no.
1941745, Adams Twp., Cambria Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 5, 2011) (noting
drill cuttings on a “torn, structurally unsound liner”).
377. Permit no. 238448, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., Oct. 26, 2010, Nov.
8, 2010 (selenium); Permit no. 240637, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., May 13,
2010 (arsenic); Permit no. 240662, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., May 3, 2010
(arsenic); Permit no. 239603, De Soto Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., June 2, 2009,
Aug. 28, 2009 (selenium); Permit no. 241394, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res.,
Aug. 5, 2010 (pH).
378. See, e.g., Vickie Wellborn, Chesapeake, Schlumberger Fined $22,000 Each
in Cows’ Deaths, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://unnaturalgas.org/weblog/2010/04/chesapeake-schlumberger-fined-22000-each-inhydraulic-fracturing-related-deaths-of-cattle (describing cattle deaths after cattle
allegedly came into contact with fracturing fluid spilled on a well site surface).
379. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.226 (West 2011) (allowing
roadspreading if approved by municipality); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907
(2011) (allowing roadspreading outside of sensitive areas); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
324.703 (2011); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.705 (2011) (allowing roadspreading for
ice or dust control); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm) (2011) (allowing
roadspreading); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-60 to 61 (proposing to allow roadspreading after beneficial use determination); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.226 (West 2011) (allowing roadspreading if approved by
municipality); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm) (2011) (allowing roadspreading).
380. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907(e)(1)(B) (2011) (allowing land
treatment onsite even for oil-based fluids); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-19
(allowing land application of water-based fluids from earthen tanks); 16 TEX.
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into the well bore or buried at the well site.381 Extensive
application of produced water and other wastes to roads or
other surface locations can also cause surface pollution if not
done properly.382
As an alternative to surface application, operators often
dispose of produced water in an underground injection control
well or through a wastewater treatment plant. Both of these
methods pose risks.383 In Texas, an improperly constructed
underground injection control well with salty oil and gas
wastes leaked into and contaminated Midland’s drinking water
aquifer,384 while several UIC wells have caused small, localized
earthquakes.385
ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(3) (allowing land farming of low-chloride fluids, burial for
those with higher chloride concentrations); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm)
(2011) (allowing land farming or land spreading with approval). But see MICH.
ADMIN. CODE r. 324.703 (2011) (requiring disposal in an injection well).
381. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § XIX.313 (2011); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
33, § IX.708 (2011) (allowing surface discharge or water-based cuttings); MD.
CODE REGS. 26.19.01.06, 26.19.01.10 (2011) (allowing land farming in areas of
disturbance); 25 PA. CODE § 78.61 (2011) (allowing land application); N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-66 to -67 (proposing to allow
burial on site; consultation with Division of Minerals Mgt. required if certain
pollutants present).
382. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 8-53 (noting the
possibility that produced waters discharged on the surface could enter surface
waters); No.Permit no. 30-045-34475, incident no. nRMD1010257007, New Mexico
Oil Conservation Div., June 11 and 18, 2009 (violation for discharge to a swampy
area).
383. Dancy, supra note 197, at 15 (noting that “[m]ost produced water is
disposed of in underground injection control wells”); Press Release, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, supra note 233 (describing the need for information about disposal
methods due to concerns about wastewater treatment); Weston, supra note 198, at
35 (describing disposal through publicly-owned treatment works).
384. See City of Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims for Purpose of
Allowance, Voting, and Determining Plan Feasibility, and Request for
Determination that Remediation Claim is Entitled to Administrative Expense
Priority at 2, In re Heritage Consolidated LLC, et al., Case. No. 10-36484-hdh-11
(D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (describing how leaking UIC wells
caused a “release of a tremendous amount of water contaminated with chloride
(and other harmful elements) into the Cenozoic Pecos Alluvium Aquifer”).
385. AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION OF
POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA
FIELD, GARVIN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 18 (2011), http://www.ogs.ou.edu/
pubsscanned/openfile/OF1_2011.pdf (“Cases of clear anthropogenically-triggered
seismicity from fluid injection are well documented with correlations between the
number of earthquakes in an area and injection, specifically injection pressures,
with earthquakes occurring very close to the well”); OHIO DEP’T OF NAT.
RESOURCES, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR 1 CLASS II INJECTION
WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, AREA 17 (2012),
http://media.cleveland.com/business_impact/other/UICReport.pdf (concluding that
there is a “compelling argument” that an injection well induced an earthquake

792

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

In Pennsylvania, as introduced above, the EPA began
investigating discharges from wastewater treatment plants
that accept produced water and fracturing waste, worrying
that the plants may not be equipped to adequately treat these
large volumes of waste before discharging into rivers.386
b.

Responses: Some Setback and Secondary
Containment Requirements, and Limited
Disposal Well Protections

Despite the risks posed by the generation of more drilling
wastes, the federal government and many states have not
adequately modified policies and regulations to address the
risks. As introduced in Part III.A.3. above, which discusses the
handling and disposal of flowback water from fracturing, this
may represent a significant gap. At the waste storage stage,
most drilling wastes are temporarily stored on site in pits;
states have a range of requirements for these pits.387 Some
states require that pits be lined, while others do not.388 Some
state and local governments require fences and/or netting
around pits to keep out birds, other wildlife, livestock, and
humans, while others fail to prevent these potential
exposures.389 Some go further, requiring steel tanks for all
waste in areas close to surface drinking water supplies.390 Still
others have modified setback requirements for wells or well
pads,391 which can prevent contamination of protected
resources if waste spills, and have updated requirements for
because, in addition to other factors, seismic events began three months after
injection operations began and “subsequent seismic events were clustered around
the vicinity of the wellbore”).
386. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
387. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 108–09 (showing liner
requirements for pits that contain flowback, some of which apply to all waste
pits); id. at 110 (showing freeboard requirements for various waste pits).
388. See id.
389. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-19.1 (2011) (requiring fencing of all
“open pits and ponds which contain saltwater” and fencing, netting, and screening
of all pits and ponds with oil); CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEX. ORDINANCE NO. 07-074 §
7.01(C)(12) (2007), available at http://www.marcellus-shale.us/pdf/Gas-DrillOrd_Arlington-TX.pdf (requiring complete enclosure of operations sites with
masonry walls); CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 18449-02-2009 § 1542(A)(26)(f) (2009), available at http://www.fortworthgov.org/uploadedFiles/
Gas_Wells/090120_gas_drilling_final.pdf (requiring all drill pits to be fenced on all
open sides).
390. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B (2012).
391. See infra note 409.
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secondary containment beneath waste and chemical storage
areas.392
For the waste disposal stage, only Ohio, which issues UIC
permits under delegated federal Safe Drinking Water Act
Authority (“SDWA”), appears to have updated its UIC
requirements to address potential earthquake problems.393 The
EPA therefore may need to exert its federal SDWA authority to
ensure that state permitting programs are adequate. Although
these
programs
already
have
bonding
and
other
requirements394 to avoid leakage of wastes into underground
aquifers, the adequacy of these programs must be reconsidered
as millions of gallons of additional waste are pumped into UIC
wells.395
At the surface, in response to concerns about
contamination from disposal, Pennsylvania has discouraged
disposal of oil and gas wastes through wastewater treatment
plants—in some cases causing these wastes to be shipped to
out-of-state plants, which may also be ill-equipped to handle
large volumes of new wastes.396 Finally, some operators
continue to send solid drilling wastes to centralized landfills for
exploration and production wastes,397 which could become
overwhelmed as thousands of new operators search for disposal

See supra note 177.
OHIO DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, CLASS II DISPOSAL WELL
REFORMS/YOUNGSTOWN SEISMIC ACTIVITY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2,
http://ohiodnr.com/downloads/northstar/YoungstownFAQ.pdf (last visited Nov. 29,
2012) (preventing construction of wells in certain formations and requiring
monitoring).
394. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 570/9-90-003, FEDERAL FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF CLASS II OIL
AND GAS-RELATED INJECTIONS WELLS 8 (1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/
r5water/uic/forms/ffrdooc2.pdf (explaining bonding requirements).
395. See, e.g., W. VA. DEP’T EVNTL. PROT., INDUSTRY GUIDANCE: GAS WELL
DRILLING/COMPLETION, LARGE WATER VOLUME FRACTURE TREATMENTS 4 (2010),
http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-gas/GI/Documents/Marcellus%20Guidance%201-810%20Final.pdf (noting that “to handle the expected amount of water, many
additional UIC wells will need to be permitted, drilled or converted”).
396. Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio Quakes Could Incite Fracking Policy Shift,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://www.nola.com/
science/index.ssf/2012/01/ohio_quakes_could_incite_frack.html (noting that some
of Pennsylvania’s “waste is trucked into Ohio, where the geology allows for more
injection wells”).
397. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907 (2011) (allowing disposal of oily
wastes at centralized E&P facility); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § XIX.313 (2011), LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § IX.708 (2011) (allowing disposal of water-based drill
cuttings at an approved disposal facility, among other options); MD. CODE REGS.
26.19.01.06, 26.19.01.10 (2011) (same).
392.
393.
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space.398 Additionally, many oil and gas wastes are disposed of
at well sites,399 or, in some cases, on roads.400
If drilling rates increase sufficiently, the wastes produced
could require revisiting these typical methods of disposal.
While it may previously have been acceptable for a few
operators to bury drill cuttings on the surface of well sites, for
example, thousands of new operators following the same
disposal procedures could raise the risk of contamination.
3.

Constructing Well Pads and Access Roads, and
Expanding Road Use

Fracturing, by enabling more wells to be drilled, does not
only increase drilling waste and the risk of improper casing, it
also, of course, requires the construction of more well pads—
surface facilities that support the well drilling operation.
Operators construct access roads to the pads if they cannot use
existing roads, thus fragmenting habitat and disturbing more
soil, and they typically use existing local roads to transport a
host of heavy equipment.401 Predictably, this also increases
certain environmental risks—particularly soil erosion and
sedimentation. This Section explores this risk and states’
limited modifications of stormwater permitting requirements
in response. It also describes the positive regulatory trend
toward mandated setbacks of wells and well pads from natural
resources that could be polluted as a result of soil erosion or
spills.

398. See, e.g., W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., INDUSTRY GUIDANCE, supra note
394, at 4 (noting that the state only has two UIC wells and strongly encouraging
reuse of wastes).
399. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-19.2 (2011) (allowing disposal of
drill cuttings on site); 25 PA. CODE § 78.61 (2011) (allowing disposal of drill
cuttings in a pit on site or land application, with varying requirements depending
on the origin of the cuttings); see also Fact Sheet: Onsite Burial (Pits, Landfills),
WASTE MGMT. INFO. SYSTEM, http://web.ead.anl.gov/dwm/techdesc/burial/
index.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (“Burial is the most common onshore
disposal technique used for disposing of drilling wastes (mud and cuttings).”).
400. See supra note 379.
401. See 2 COLO. CODE. REGS. § 404-1:1002(e)(4) (2011) (“Existing roads shall
be used to the greatest extent practicable to avoid erosion and minimize the land
area devoted to oil and gas operations.”).
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Risks: Soil Erosion and Migration of Other
Contaminants

Any type of construction—including construction of well
pads and access roads—can cause soil erosion, which can
pollute surface water and may introduce invasive plants as
construction equipment travels from site to site.402 In
Michigan, state officials recently noted a “badly eroded” access
road leading to a well site.403 Approximately 22 percent of
violations at well sites in the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas
between 2006 and 2010 allegedly involved eroded well sites or
access roads.404 Pennsylvania has similarly noted a “failure to
minimize accelerated erosion” or potential erosion at a number
of Marcellus Shale sites since drilling and fracturing began.405
402. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-14 to -68.
403. Permit no. 49851, Antrim County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (May 2,
2011) (violation noted; no known enforcement).
404. ARK. PUB. POL’Y PANEL, VIOLATIONS OF WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
FROM GAS PRODUCTION IN ARKANSAS 4 (2011), arpanel.org/policy/reports/naturalgas/violations/at_download/file.http://arpanel.org/content/Violations%20of%20Wat
er%20Standards.pdf.
405. Permit no. 051-24411, German, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011)
(violations noted and resolved); See also Permit no. 115-20019, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 11520036, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and
resolved); Permit no. 115-20043, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011)
(violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20087, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 5, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20091,
Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved);
Permit no. 115-20171, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 14, 2011) (violations
noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20178, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr.
6, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20201, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 11520252, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 31, 2011) (violations noted and
resolved); Permit no. 115-20307, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 2,
2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20334, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. (Feb. 24, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20363,
Rush, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 17, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no. 11520481, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 27, 2011) (violations noted and
resolved); Permit no. 115-20499, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 10, 2011)
(violations noted); Permit no. 115-20279, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Feb.
28, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21208, Albany, Pa. Dep’t
of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 28, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 01521589, Rome, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no.
0115-20255, Troy, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 17, 2011) (violations noted);
Permit no. 015-20943, Troy, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 5, 2011) (violations
noted); Permit no. 015-20945, Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011)
(violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21209, Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no. 015-21392, Orwell, Pa. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 12, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21463,
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Increased truck traffic, both for construction of the well pad
and the development of the well itself, can also strain small
roads,406 while more diesel engines contribute to higher air
emissions. A Texas citizens’ group recently challenged an oil
and gas disposal well on the basis of this concern,
unsuccessfully arguing that the determination of whether the
well was in the “public interest”—a necessary factor for its
approval—must include considerations about traffic safety and
damage to local roads.407
As discussed below, governments have taken measures to
address road use concerns. However, they have largely failed to
directly address expanded erosion impacts, with the exception
of requirements for well site setbacks from water.
b.

Responses: Controlling Well Pad Location and
Implementing Stormwater Permitting

The construction of well pads and access roads has long
been regulated at the local, state, and federal levels. Many local
governments control the location of well pads through zoning
(prohibiting oil and gas wells in residential areas, for example),
and states increasingly require that a well or well pad be set
back a minimum distance from various natural resources.408
Indeed, several recent regulatory modifications have focused on
adding or expanding setback requirements.409 These types of
Wyalusing, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 4, 2011) (violations noted and resolved);
Permit no. 113-20055, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations
noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20078, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May
10, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20094, Elkland, Pa.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 1, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no.
115-20317, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 20, 2011) (violations noted and
resolved); Permit no. 131-20115, Meshoppen, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 28,
2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20005, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 1, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21426,
Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 5, 2011) (violations noted and resolved).
406. See MICHELE ROGERS, PENN. ST. COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI., MARCELLUS
SHALE: WHAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NEED TO KNOW 11 (2008),
http://www.coshoctoncounty.net/cpa/images/marcellusshalewhatlocalgovernmento
fficialsneedtoknow.pdf (“The process of drilling, fracturing, and maintaining
natural gas wells can create significant heavy truck traffic on rural roads, many of
which were not designed for carrying vehicles of this size.”).
407. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water,
336 S.W.3d 619, 622–23, 633 (Tex. 2011).
408. See infra notes 412–418.
409. PA. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Bill Information, Regular Session 2011-2012,
House Bill 1950, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_history.cfm?
syear=2011&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1950 (updating setbacks to include
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regulations can prevent erosion and spilled substances from
entering surface waters and other protected resources.410
Some states, such as Texas, have few, if any, setback
requirements—mandating only that wells be two-hundred feet
from houses.411 Others (including Colorado,412 New York,413
New Mexico,414 Pennsylvania,415 and West Virginia416) have
minimum setbacks between well pads, wells, or tanks and
surface waters, such as streams, public water supplies, and
wetlands.417 Additionally, New York officials have engaged in a
lengthy discussion as to whether they will permit any
fracturing within the watershed of New York City’s unfiltered
water supply—a network of surface reservoirs in the Catskills
area.418
States have not been as proactive in limiting erosion from

minimum distances from edge of disturbed sites and increasing some setbacks);
H.B. 401, 2011 Leg., 4th Special Sess. (W. Va. 2011), available at
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Status/bills_history.cfm?year=2011&sessiontype
=4X&input=401 (showing legislative changes, which require, among other actions,
setbacks of wells from streams, wetlands, and other natural resources).
410. See, e.g, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-39
(noting that secondary containment requirements and “setbacks proposed for
high-volume hydraulic fracturing are likely to effectively contain most surface
spills at and in the vicinity of the well pads” but that there remains a risk of
release to nearby resources, including aquifers).
411. TEX. LOC. GOV. CODE § 253.005(c) (2012).
412. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603 (2011) (providing a three-hundred-foot
buffer for public water supplies and limitations on drilling within intermediate
and external buffers).
413. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-34 (proposing
500-foot setback between well pad and stream); id. at 1-17 (proposing a 2,000-foot
setback from public water supplies).
414. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring a 500-foot
setback of pits or tanks from wetlands); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (LexisNexis
2012) (requiring a 300-foot setback of pits or tanks from streams).
415. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(3) (2012) (requiring unconventional wells to
be set back 300 feet from wetlands greater than one-acre and the edge of the
disturbed site to be set back 100 feet); Id. § 3215(b)(1) (requiring the vertical
unconventional well bore to be set back 300 feet or the edge of the disturbed area
to be set back 100 feet from a stream—whichever is greater).
416. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-12 (2012) (requiring a 100-foot setback for wells or
well pads from wetlands); Id. § 22-6A-12(b) (requiring a 100-foot setback from
streams and 300-foot setback from naturally-producing trout streams).
417. 58. PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4) (2012) (100-foot setback of well or well
site from stream or wetland greater than one acre); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10
(LexisNexis 2011) (300-foot setback of pits from streams); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. §
404-1:603 (2011) (300-foot buffer for public water supplies); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-34 (500-foot setback between well pad and
stream).
418. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-55 to -56.
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sites. The federal CWA419 controls erosion from well pads and
access roads420 through stormwater permitting for sites one
acre and larger. Operating under a cooperative federalist
scheme, states typically implement these permitting
programs,421 but few states have updated their permitting
requirements to recognize potential impacts of larger well
numbers, including more soil disturbances at well sites and
access roads.422 Arkansas,423 New York,424 Ohio,425 and
Pennsylvania426 have been more proactive by requiring specific
erosion and sediment control practices for certain wells.
The lack of a comprehensive response to erosion may result
from the relative ease of ignoring nonpoint source runoff from
diverse sites. But states and municipalities have not been able
to ignore the direct road damage caused by thousands of new
trucks traveling to and from sites. Accordingly, some
municipalities have entered into road use agreements with
operators—requiring them, for example, to repair, build, or
expand roads and to limit municipal liability for road
damage.427
Despite progress in addressing road use, requiring
setbacks of oil and gas wells and sites from protected resources,
and modifying some erosion controls, much remains to be done.
Particularly with the increased use of horizontal drilling—
419. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(l) (2011).
420. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction
Activities, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/oilgas.cfm (last updated Mar. 9,
2009).
421. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Authorization Status for EPA’s
Stormwater Construction and Industrial Programs, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes
stormwater/authorizationstatus.cfm (last updated Apr. 16, 2012).
422. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 33–34, 38.
423. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-17(h)(6) (2012) (requiring a “stormwater
erosion and sediment control plan” for each well site).
424. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-26 to -29
(requiring a new general permit for oil and gas operations and a special permit for
stormwater discharges within 500 feet of principal aquifers).
425. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-07(B) (2012) (requiring best management
practices at sites in urbanized areas).
426. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 5500-PM-OG0005, INSTRUCTIONS FOR A
NOTICE OF INTENT (NOI) FOR COVERAGE UNDER THE EROSION AND SEDIMENT
CONTROL GENERAL PERMIT (ESCGP-1) FOR EARTH DISTURBANCE ASSOCIATED
WITH OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION, PROCESSING OR TREATMENT
OPERATIONS OR TRANSMISSION FACILITIES (2011), http://www.elibrary.dep
.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-83401/Modified%205500-PM-OG0005%20NOI%
20Instructions%202.pdf.
427. See Martin E. Garza, Local Regulation of Gas Development in an Urban
Setting: The Texas Experience, in 60 CTR. FOR AM. & INTL. LAW, OIL & GAS LAW
273, 285 (2009).
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which increases the flexibility of drilling locations428—states
should consistently focus on requiring minimum distances
between well pads (not just the well itself) and protected
surface and underground resources. They also must modify
current stormwater permitting requirements to address higher
levels of erosion and associated water quality impacts.
4.

Using Diesel, Drilling Fluids, and Drilling Muds,
and Storing Produced Oil and Gas on Site

Constructing well pads and access roads and drilling oil
and gas wells requires diesel equipment, grease, and hydraulic
fluids for drilling rigs and other equipment, as well as drilling
fluids and muds.429 A higher drilling rate, therefore, once again
expands certain risks, yet it has generated few specific
regulatory responses. As with the handling of fracturing
chemicals and drilling and fracturing wastes, the use of
equipment on site can cause spills of certain chemicals—often
diesel. Most states have not changed their regulations to
specifically address equipment spills, although existing spill
prevention and response plans, as well as the setbacks and
secondary containment requirements introduced above,430 can
help to control the impact of these spills.
a.

Risks: Spills and Contamination of Surface or
Underground Water and Soil

When equipment is used to construct well pads, roads, and
drill wells, diesel fuel can leak from engines or can spill when
poured into tanks.431 Drilling fluids and muds, which lubricate
the drill bit and otherwise aid the drilling process, sometimes
also contain petroleum.432 Both new and spent drilling fluids
and muds can spill when transferred between pits or tanks and
428. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, DOE-FE-0385, ENVTL.
BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
TECHNOLOGY 36–37 (1999), http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/
environ_benefits/env_benefits.pdf.
429. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-99.
430. See supra notes 410, 412–416 (setbacks); supra note 177 (containment).
431. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-98 to -99; infra
notes 438–439.
432. Cf. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1005 (2011) (requiring off-site disposal of
waste from petroleum-based drilling in a floodplain); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERV., supra note 31, at § 7-66 to -67 (requiring disposal of cuttings from
petroleum-based drilling in a landfill).
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the well.433 Further, oil- or gas-containing substances produced
from the well may spill from the wellhead or storage tanks and
pollute the site or nearby areas.434 These familiar well
production risks increase with each new well drilled.
A number of violations noted by state regulators in
counties with shale or tight sands production illustrate these
risks. In one incident in Louisiana, an operator released oilbased drilling mud near a well. The mud migrated to a natural
drainage, leading to an administrative settlement that
required the operator to document clean-up and submit lab
results or pay civil penalties.435 In Pennsylvania’s Marcellus
Shale, the DEP also noted violations of state environmental
laws caused by surface releases of drilling mud,436 including
one 1,500-gallon spill.437 And in a complaint filed in federal
district court, sixty-three plaintiffs from Montrose and Dimock,
Pennsylvania, alleged that an operator caused “[d]iesel fuel . . .
to be spilled onto the ground near Plaintiffs’ homes and water
wells” and discharged drilling mud “into diversion ditches near
Plaintiffs’ homes and water wells.”438 Further, a confirmed
diesel fuel spill of less than five gallons occurred at a
Pennsylvania site outside of a containment area; the operator
cleaned it up with absorbent materials and excavated the
soil.439 In Michigan, one “equipment collapse” spilled oil on the
surface at a well site,440 and a citizen complaint alleged that oil
leaked from equipment into a nearby lake, although no
environmental violation was found.441 In New Mexico, a drain
433. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 436–437.
434. See supra notes 372–376.
435. Permit no. 239818, Red River Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Resources, Sept. 6,
2009 (settled Nov. 12, 2009).
436. See, e.g., Permit no. 115-20357, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection
(Apr. 15, 2011); Permit no. 115-20339, Jessup, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Mar.
31, 2011) (“[d]rilling mud observed on ground surface near plastic”; violation
noted, no known enforcement); Permit no. 115-20473, Forest Lake, Pa. Dep’t of
Envt. Protection (Mar. 16, 2011) (noting “residual mud” at the site; violation
noted, no known enforcement).
437. Permit no. 131-20047, Washington, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Feb. 14,
2011) (spill on “surface of the ground outside of the containment area”; violation
noted, no known enforcement).
438. Amended Complaint at 14, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., Civil
Action No. 3:09-cv-02294-TIV (M.D. Pa., Mar. 5, 2010).
439. Permit no. 115-20453, Rush, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Mar. 2011 (violation
noted).
440. Permit no. 51006, Antrim County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Sept.
2003) (violation noted, no known enforcement).
441. Permit no. 35926, Kalkaska County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (July
2001) (no violation or enforcement).
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valve on a tank containing produced oil froze and released
eight barrels of oil, two of which were recovered.442 Other
equipment or human-based errors in New Mexico have led to
surface spills of six to eighteen barrels of oil, some of which was
recovered.443
Considering the thousands of wells drilled, these types of
incidents may not cause much concern. Indeed, initial review of
select environmental violations at unconventional oil and gas
sites suggests that in some states the majority of violations are
minor or involved no environmental effects.444 More research is
needed to determine the percentage of wells drilled that lead to
these types of spills and the number of spills that are
significant. This, in turn, requires further analysis of the
percentage of wells that are inspected—and how often—as well
as whether officials provide notice prior to entering sites for
investigation. From the data currently available, it appears
that surface spills in some states are much more common than
other types of violations, such as improper casing of wells, but
that they occur at a small percentage of the wells
investigated.445 While perhaps not posing a large risk, surface
spills may be more important in the aggregate than, say,
concerns about underground contamination from fracturing.
One underground contamination incident, on the other hand,
could dwarf the effects of multiple small spills due to the
difficulties of detecting and cleaning up underground releases.
Although continued study of the likelihood of underground
contamination is important, it should not occur at the expense
of attention to surface incidents.

442. Permit no. 30-045-24395, incident no. nBP0800952968, N.M. Oil Conserv.
Div. (Dec. 2007) (violation noted, no known enforcement).
443. See Permit no. 30-045-29710, incident no. nBP0918933399, N.M. Oil
Conserv. Div., (Feb. 2009) (six barrels spilled when valve on wellhead froze, four
were recovered); Permit no. 30-045-29095, incident no. nBP0711033468, N.M. Oil
Conserv. Div., (Dec. 2006) (ten barrels spilled due to human error, all were
recovered); Permit no. 30-045-26706, incident no. nBP1026448466, N.M. Oil
Conserv. Div., (July 2010) (separator malfunction spilled eighteen barrels, nine
were recovered; violations noted).
444. See Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations,
supra note 94, at 25.
445. Id. at 17 (showing a generally low percentage of surface spills, with the
exception of New Mexico, for which much of the enforcement data came from a
spill database).
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Responses: Use of Existing Spill Prevention
Plans, Expanded Setbacks, and Secondary
Containment Requirements

As introduced above in the context of chemical and waste
spills, few efforts have directly responded to concerns about
surface spills from drilling equipment and other drilling
activities. This is likely in part due to existing regulations that
address some of these concerns. Some federal regulations
potentially apply to certain violations, including large oil
spills,446 but many problems fall under state jurisdiction. Most
states require some form of spill prevention plan, in which
operators show how they will avoid spills by, for example, using
secondary containment underneath drilling equipment and
responding when spills occur.447 Most states also require
reporting of spills of many substances involved in drilling,
although some only require reporting of oil spills, and others
only require reporting spills of hazardous chemicals of a certain
quantity.448 The time and method of reporting also varies,
ranging from within twenty-four hours of the spill to seven
days, via hotline or written notification.449 Nearly all of these
regulations, with the exception of New York’s proposed spill
prevention and containment regulations450 and Colorado’s

446. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012) (creating liability for certain spills of oil
into or onto U.S. navigable waters).
447. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:, pt. IX, § 905 (2011); MD. DEP’T OF THE
ENV’T, supra note 289, at 12; MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.2006 (2011) (pollution
incident prevention plan if certain threshold of chemicals is at site); PA. DEP’T. OF
ENVTL. PROT., OIL & GAS MGMT. PRACTICES 4, (2001), http://www.elibra
ry.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Version-48243/chap4.pdf (requiring Preparedness,
Prevention, and Contingency Plan).
448. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 30, at 95–96 (describing states’
requirements for spill prevention and response plans).
449. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:337, 906(b) (2011) (requiring 240hour notification); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-601(2) (2012) (requiring reporting to
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of all spills and releases of more than
five barrels or of any size that could threaten waters); MD. CODE REGS.
26.19.01.02 (2011) (requiring reporting of spills two state agency within two hours
of detection); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1008 (2011) (requiring operators to
“[p]romptly report” all spills; report within eight hours spills of “42 gallons or
more of brine, crude oil, or oil and gas field waste”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-57 (requiring verbal notification of state agency
within two hours of discovering spill); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-30 (2011)
(requiring verbal notification of any release within twenty-four hours of release).
450. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-28
(requiring secondary containment and drip pans).
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revised regulations,451 were on the books prior to the rise of
fracturing and the accompanying expansion of oil and gas
development.
In addition to existing spill prevention and response plans,
some states’ requirements for the setbacks of well pads from
protected resources will help to prevent equipment spills from
affecting nearby environmental resources. Few states have
adequately focused on the potentially broad impacts of surface
spills, including from equipment and drilling activities,
although some have comprehensively addressed this issue.
5.

Emitting Gas Condensate and Air Pollution from
Drilling and Fracturing Equipment

An oil and gas drilling site is, although only temporarily,
host to a range of diesel engines running constantly and
emitting a range of air pollutants.452 Operators use bulldozers
and excavators to construct the well pad, which hosts the well
and its associated pits and tanks, and the access road to the
pad.453 Rigs, trucks, and other equipment run during the
drilling process (and later during fracturing), and after drilling,
the gas from the well is “flared” to test the well before
converting it to the production stage.454 In some regions, gas,
which is not pure, contains condensate that is stored in tanks
and may emit volatile organic compounds into the air.455 Some
gas flowing through pipelines also leaks, emitting a potent
greenhouse gas.456 All of these emissions can, in certain
451. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 604(a)(4) (requiring secondary
containment around all produced water, crude oil, and condensate tanks); COLO.
OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 317B (requiring emergency spill response
programs in three-hundred foot buffer areas around public water supplies).
452. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT 2 (May 6, 2011),
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/aq/aqm/docs/Marcellus_NC_0506-11.pdf (noting that “pollutants are emitted from diesel engines” at the well
construction, drilling and fracturing stages).
453. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-135.
454. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452, at 1.
455. Cf. Oil and Gas in the Natural Sector: New Source Performance
Standards and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
Reviews, 76 Fed. Reg. 52738 (proposed Aug. 23, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63)
(proposing controls on VOC emissions from condensate tanks).
456. See ROBERT W. HOWARTH ET AL., METHANE AND THE GREENHOUSE GAS
FOOTPRINT OF NATURAL GAS FROM SHALE CLIMATIC CHANGE 6 (Climatic Change
2011), http://www.sustainablefuture.cornell.edu/news/attachments/Howarth-EtAl2011.pdf (discussing estimates of pipeline leakage).
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quantities, affect human health and welfare, and the federal
government and states have only begun to address the many
air quality issues that enhanced drilling and fracturing may
generate.457 The following Subsections describe the risks
associated with these emissions and the state and the federal
government initial efforts to address them.
a.

Risks: Adding
Problems

to

Existing

Air

Quality

Particularly on well sites in urban and suburban areas—as
are common in Texas’s Barnett Shale458—drilling and
fracturing activities can exacerbate existing air quality
problems.459 In pristine areas, they may cause new visibility
and odor problems.460 Both Texas and Pennsylvania have
increased some air emissions monitoring near shale gas wells
to measure the magnitude of this problem.461 Pennsylvania’s
initial results show “[e]levated methane levels” at two
compressor stations and well sites; “methyl mercaptan,” which
produced odors; and “[c]oncentrations of certain natural gas
constituents” near drilling operations.462 The Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality collected air quality
samples downwind of natural gas compressor stations in Lake

457. See infra text accompanying note 461 (describing how some states are just
beginning to monitor air emissions from natural gas well sites).
458. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 5, at 5–10 (noting that “there is gas under
Fort Worth and wells have been drilled in the mid-cities area and near DFW
airport”); Applications and Permits, CITY OF FORT WORTH, http://fortworth
texas.gov/gaswells/default.aspx?id=50608 (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (showing
1,483 producing gas wells within the city).
459. Cf. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIV.,
OIL & GAS EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION REGULATION NO. 7 REQUIREMENTS 1
(2011), http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/sbap/SBAPoilgastankguidance.pdf (explaining Colorado air quality regulations that apply to oil and gas condensate tank
owners and operators in nonattainment areas).
460. See, e.g., Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, COLO.
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHEAP/CBON/1251597643322 (noting stricter controls on oil and gas air pollutant
emissions statewide and in the “Front-Range ozone nonattainment area,” where
air quality already fails to comply with federal requirements).
461. See Barnett Shale Geological Area, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY,
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/barnettshale (last visited Dec. 1, 2012)
(describing air sampling, inventories, and other air-quality-related activities in
the Barnett Shale); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA
MARCELLUS SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452.
462. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452, at ii–iii.
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Arlington and Dish, Texas, concluding that with the possible
exception of one pollutant, which was not detected at levels for
which the TCEQ could measure health effects, concentrations
of carbonyls in the air were “not of any short-term health or
welfare concern.”463 Staff members at the site noticed “exhaust”
and “natural gas” odors, which they concluded were likely air
pollutants not measured by their analysis.464
Each new site drilled raises the quantity of air pollutants
released and suggests that, at least, we must continue to
monitor emissions. Several state and national studies agree
with, for example, the Department of Energy’s Shale Gas
Production Subcommittee’s call for more attention to air
emissions,465 and the New York Department of Environmental
Conservation’s observation regarding potentially strong air
impacts from drilling and fracturing.466
b.

Responses: Monitoring or Capping Certain
Emissions

The EPA has addressed certain air quality concerns
through its recent finalization of rules that control VOCs from
fracturing and refractured wells.467 The Clean Air Act may also
limit emissions from oil and gas sites in limited circumstances.
Particularly in areas that have not achieved Clean Air Act
standards, states regulate even minor sources of air pollution—
including oil and gas sites—through their Clean Air Act State
Implementation Plans.468
The less aggressive response by states has been to monitor
emissions. As introduced above, Pennsylvania and Texas have
463. Interoffice Memorandum from Shannon Ethridge, Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l
Quality, Toxicology Div., Chief Eng’r’s Off., to John Sadler, Dep. Dir., Off. of
Compliance & Enforcement 1 (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/
public/implementation/barnett_shale/healthEffects/2011.02.24-CarbonylMonitorin
gProject.pdf.
464. Id. at 2.
465. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE
SECOND NINETY-DAY REPORT 4 (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/
resources/111811_final_report.pdf.
466. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-132 to -140.
467. 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/
20120417finalrule.pdf (Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance
Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
Reviews).
468. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH & ENV’T, AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL DIV., supra note 459 (describing air emissions regulations for all oil and
gas condensate tanks in nonattainment areas).

806

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

conducted air monitoring in areas with heavy drilling and
fracturing.469 Some states, however, have gone further by
substantively limiting emissions. New York has proposed a
range of controls, including limitations on the length of time for
which drilling may occur,470 a greenhouse gas mitigation
requirement,471 and a mandate that the vapor from condensate
tanks be minimized.472 Colorado requires that condensate and
produced water tanks with the potential to emit a certain
quantity of volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) per year must
reduce emissions of VOCs by at least 95 percent in certain
counties and must be placed more than a quarter mile from
buildings.473 Throughout the state, condensate tanks with
particularly high annual VOC emissions also must capture 95
percent of these emissions.474
In addition, several states control the venting and flaring
of gas, which occurs either during oil production (when gas that
comes up along with oil is not captured for sale), drilling,
flowback, or just before production—when the first produced
gas is burned off.475 Louisiana, for example, provides that
operators must “minimize gas releases into the open air” and
may flare (burn off) gas but may not have an open flame within
200 feet of a building.476 New York limits the amount of gas
venting permitted during flowback within a consecutive twelvemonth period,477 and Oklahoma allows flaring of a certain
amount of gas per day without a permit.478 If operating without
a permit, the operator must use a “suitable” stack for flaring
“to prevent a hazard to people or property.”479
In a number of states, regulations do not control the total
See supra notes 462–464.
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-131.
Id. at 7-116 to -117.
Id. at 7-108.
2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:805 (Westlaw 2012).
Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, COLO. DEP’T OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIV., http://www.
cdphe.state.co.us/ap/oilgas.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).
475. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-108 (limiting
gas venting).
476. LA. OFF. OF CONSERV. ORDER No U-HS, at 4 (2009), http://dnr.
louisiana.gov/assets/docs/news/2009/U-HS.pdf.
477. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-108 (providing
maximum venting in a 12-month period).
478. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15 (2011) (allowing venting without a
permit if it is “not economically feasible to market the gas” and if other conditions
are met).
479. Id.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
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quantity of air emissions from oil and gas sites, but they do aim
to ensure that emissions do not build up in one area.
Employing the old trick of midwestern power plants (which,
prior to the implementation of stricter Clean Air Act controls,
built tall smokestacks and sent air emissions to the East
Coast)480, Montana requires minimum stack heights on drilling
equipment in certain areas,481 and Farmington, New Mexico
requires exhaust to be vented away from well sites.482
State regulations that solely monitor or displace air
emissions from gas well sites may not go far enough. Some oil
and gas operators faced no federal (or, in some cases, state)
controls on air emissions until the recent implementation of
certain federal air regulations,483 and progress beyond the VOC
controls already implemented by the EPA remains to be made.
The risks of shale gas development pose a daunting hurdle
to local, regional, state, and federal regulators and
policymakers. Those responsible for protecting public health
and the environment have paid insufficient attention to the
risks that emerge from two core changes: the new stages of gas
development introduced by slickwater fracturing and, just as
importantly, the sheer rise in the number of wells drilled as a
result of fracturing. Although all levels of government have
begun to respond, it appears that this effort is not enough.
Much more will be required to make shale gas development a
safe practice that benefits communities and the national
economy while adequately controlling environmental risk.
The argument that regulation is currently inadequate
assumes, of course, that the current externalities of shale gas
and tight sands development are problematic simply because
they exist. This broad assumption requires review in future
study; it is not based on a cost-benefit analysis comparing the
expense of externality reduction to the benefits in terms of
improved health and environmental protection; rather, it
assumes that many of the risks, such as contamination from
480. See Acid Rain Questions and Answers, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8418.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
481. See MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.8.402 (2011) (requiring “good engineering” stack
heights in some areas).
482. CODE OF CITY OF FARMINGTON, N.M. § 19-2-74(f)(6) (2011), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10760.
483. See Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards: Regulatory Actions,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/actions.html
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that in April 2012 the EPA issued the “first
federal air standards for natural gas wells that are hydraulically fractured”).
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spills, could be reduced at a relatively low expense to industry
and that improved regulatory efforts are merited. Others,
however, note that industry has already made efforts to reduce
risks and is continuing to implement best management
practices;484 some also argue that state regulation is
adequate485 and that oil and gas extraction has far fewer
effects than other industries486 and, thus, does not merit what
may be viewed as over-regulation. The risks of shale and tight
sands oil and gas extraction should indeed be viewed in a
larger context—one that recognizes the benefits of this
extraction and the comparative effects of other industries,
including other types of mineral extraction. This does not
justify, however, fully ignoring the impacts or efforts to limit
them—particularly when efforts to reduce known risks do not
impose a high cost on industry, and would meaningfully
improve human health or the environment.
The following Part briefly suggests the risks that
governments should prioritize and the considerations that
should inform the level of government at which these risks will
best be addressed.
IV. PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS FOR A MODIFIED FOCUS
From introducing new stages to the well development
process to enabling more well construction, fracturing has
expanded certain environmental risks of oil and gas
development. The introduction of fracturing chemicals to the
well development process raises the risks of chemical spills and
improper disposal of wastewater, and fracturing increases the
484. Cf., AM. PETROL. INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE/BEST
PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (HF) (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.api.org/
~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Hydraulic_Fracturing_InfoSheet.ash
(showing
detailed industry guidance on best practices for fracturing but not estimating how
many operators implement this guidance).
485. See, e.g., GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 7 (May 2009),
http://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/state_oil_and_gas_regulations_
designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pdf (noting regulatory improvements in
Pennsylvania and arguing that “[s]tate oil and gas regulations are adequately
designed to directly protect water resources”).
486. See, e.g., Mike Krancer, Sec’y., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Hydraulic
Fracturing: Facts, History, Context and Perspective, Presentation Before the
American Bar Assn., Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources, 20th
Section Fall Meeting (Oct. 13, 2012) (arguing that “[u]nfortunately, this incredible
opportunity to secure and develop a clean, reliable, domestic and affordable
energy source has been attacked”) (on file with author).
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amount of water consumed for each well.487 Additionally,
drilling more wells appears to increase the chance of methane
escaping into water, expands the quantities of wastes typically
associated with oil and gas drilling, increases the chance of
spills from equipment and of drilling materials, and creates
more well pads and access roads that cause erosion.488 The
policy debate and regulatory processes, however, have not yet
shifted to adequately address these problems, as discussed in
Part III. While the debate should include questions about
groundwater contamination from fracturing, as well as
institutional competence and federalism, we must know the
risks at all stages of well development and identify the areas
that need the most attention. The following Sections identify
these priority areas and suggest initial steps toward locating
the most effective levels of governance for improved regulatory
and policy responses.
A.

Needed Responses

At the broadest level, institutions with authority over
drilling and fracturing must comprehensively revisit their
policies and regulations, noting the most important risks and
determining whether existing regimes adequately address
these risks. To do this, they should follow the lead of New York,
which has conducted a detailed environmental analysis.489
Because risks are not fully known, they also must implement
regulations that help to generate more information on the
impacts of drilling and fracturing, thus forming a clearer
picture of risks. Requiring the testing of water near oil and gas
sites prior to and after well development and reporting of
quantities of waters used, wastes produced, and pollutants
emitted would help to produce this type of needed information.
Next, state agencies must focus on updating regulations in
the core areas of risk and requiring more than disclosure and
reporting. Informational mandates that states have tended to
implement, such as chemical disclosure and water use
reporting, are important first steps toward better
understanding risks, yet informational requirements will not,
for example, ensure adequate instream flow as millions of
gallons of water are withdrawn from streams, nor will they
487.
488.
489.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31.
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prevent chemical spills from improperly maintained tanks or
pits.
To assist states in identifying the best regulatory options,
the federal government should provide a comprehensive
database of state, local, and regional oil, gas, and fracturing
regulations and should separately document regulatory
modifications as they occur. This would remind the laggards of
areas where improvement is needed and demonstrate the many
variations in risk response. Ideally, this database would also
include industry guidelines, such as those published by the
American Petroleum Institute,490 as well as industry best
practices and the locations in which those practices have been
implemented.
From the preliminary risks identified here and the
regulatory innovations that have already occurred in some
states, as discussed above, the following are examples of
substantive regulations that states should consider:
1)

2)

3)
4)
5)

Require detailed spill prevention and response
plans beyond those already followed at oil and
gas sites and new substantive provisions within
those plans, such as the use of drip pans
beneath the filling ports for chemical tanks;
Following the lead of states like Pennsylvania
and West Virginia and the River Basin
Commissions in the Marcellus region,491 ensure
that surface water withdrawals will not reduce
instream flow below levels needed to support
aquatic life and identify maximum daily levels
of water that may be withdrawn from various
sources;
Require the use of closed-loop systems for the
storage of drilling and fracturing wastes,
particularly in sensitive environmental areas;
Increase required setbacks between well pads
(not just wells) and natural resources;
Require all wastewater treatment plants
accepting flowback water to provide evidence
that they will be able to treat flowback and

490. See, e.g., AM. PETROL. INST., WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, supra note 200.
491. See supra text accompanying notes 290, 292; W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6A-7(e)
(Westlaw 2012) (placing conditions on water withdrawals).
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7)
8)

9)

10)

11)
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produced water, and require operators to
receive approval before disposing of wastes at
wastewater treatment plants;
Update underground injection control well
casing requirements to prevent well leakage.
Additionally, like Ohio,492 require that
operators proposing new UIC wells prove that
the proposed location is not likely to cause
localized
earthquakes
and
continuously
monitor the wells for seismicity issues;
Encourage or require reuse of flowback and
produced water;
Update well casing requirements to prohibit
the use of used casing (or require that used
casing meet certain pressure tests) and
increase the distance that casing must extend
below underground water resources;
Require operators to pressure test the well
before fracturing, up to the maximum pressure
to which the well will be subjected, and require
blowout equipment with remote control
capabilities;
Following the lead of Pennsylvania and West
implement
a
rebuttable
Virginia,493
presumption that methane contamination
within a certain distance from the drilling
operation that occurs within a certain time
after drilling was caused by the operator or
implement a similar regime that allows
landowners to investigate contamination
without having to litigate the issue; and
Require air emissions monitoring and reporting
at all wells and consider needed minor source
regulation.

This list only includes a small sample of likely needed
responses that have not yet been consistently implemented by
states. In addition to writing these and a number of other
needed regulations, states must ensure that they have
adequate capacity to enforce their updated regulations, even in

492.
493.

See supra note 398 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358–359 and accompanying text.
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difficult financial times, and that their enforcement staff are
adequately educated and trained. West Virginia has been a
recent leader in this area, requiring minimum education and
experience levels as well as minimum salaries for agency
staff.494
This Article provides a preliminary framework for this
improved response, suggesting the likely areas of focus. Some
of the potential risks identified here may not, in the end, be as
serious as this Article has suggested, while others may be more
important than anticipated. Indeed, scientific research and
further study of violations is essential in order to better define
risks. But the recent violations at oil and gas sites, combined
with the existing literature, provide an important, concrete
starting point and suggest how the policy response should
proceed.
B.

Federalism Considerations

In any proposal for improved regulation, preliminary
questions of ideal levels of governance often arise. My previous
articles have partially addressed governance level concerns,
describing the many federal exemptions for oil and gas and
suggesting that in some cases, states are not adequately filling
in the gaps.495 But this fails to explain whether local, regional,
state, or federal actors would best fill these gaps or whether a
new regulatory scheme that combines several levels is
necessary.
Several considerations are relevant in normative
federalism considerations, including the scope of the
externalities generated by shale gas development, the expertise
of the governing actors and the resources available to them, the
closeness of these actors to regulated entities, and the extent to
which the governance choice will allow for continued innovative
experimentation—both in terms of the institutions that
regulate shale gas activity and the substance of regulation,
among many others.
For effects that cross state lines, such as air emissions and
river pollution from wastewater treatment discharges, a
federal cooperative governance scheme may be the best

494. W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6-2a (2011).
495. See Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, supra note
243, at 276–82.

2013]

RISK AND RESPONSE

813

approach496 and in some cases already is being implemented
under federal environmental statutes.497 For any interstate
effects not yet being addressed at the federal level, a regime
with a federal floor would provide a guaranteed minimal level
of environmental protection while allowing states to
experiment above this floor.498 A federal information
clearinghouse containing state laws would improve state
implementation and enable effective, tailored responses.
Regional schemes also offer promising models for interstate
effects, particularly where environmental factors—such as the
level of radioactivity in wastewater—are unique to the
formation shared by several states.
However, many of the effects of shale gas development are
intrastate and raise more complicated questions about the best
level of governance. Although these effects do not cross state
lines, races to the bottom among states competing to attract
development can cause collective environmental degradation.
Races to the top may also be occurring, as evidenced by New
York’s relatively precautionary approach.
Even if races one way or another are emerging, there are
other reasons to question whether purely local effects should be
governed only by municipalities or states. Local actors,
although closer to the development and more aware of its
location-specific benefits and harms, may lack the resources or
expertise needed to protect populations from substantial risks.
While a federal clearinghouse could help here—as with
regulation above a federal floor for interstate effects—states
lacking the resources to implement suggested regulatory
496. Cf. David Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy
of Energy Production, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 (2012) (“Consistent with the
public economics literature on federalism, the first rationale for federal regulation
focuses on the geographic scope of the externalities in question, and argues for
regulation at the lowest level of government that encompasses (geographically)
the costs and benefits of the regulated activity”).
497. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, supra note 116
(discussing the commencement of writing wastewater treatment standards for
flowback); 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/
20120417finalrule.pdf (discussing air quality standards).
498. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption,
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1585, 1587 (2007)
(noting the institutional diversity enabled by a floor and comparing its benefits to
biodiversity, noting that if one institution fails, another is available to address
risks, thus reducing the vulnerability of the entire system); id. at 1592 (defining
the experimentalist regulation that occurs above a floor as a system in which
“regulators reexamine their choices, measure results, and improve regulatory
choices in an ongoing way”).
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programs would not benefit from simple suggestions for
improvement. States also could be inefficiently captured by
industry, which benefits from revolving-door connections to
state regulatory bodies and has lobbied heavily against federal
fracturing regulation.499
On the other hand, states have a long history of regulation
and thus a deep body of expertise. They have also indicated a
willingness to respond to the concerns of the scattered
populous,500 suggesting that public choice predictions don’t
always hold true—or that environmental and citizen groups
have managed to overcome free-rider obstacles and have, in
limited cases, organized into an effective lobbying group that
counters industry’s influence.
Professor David Spence, who has thoroughly analyzed
federalism rationales in the shale gas context, concludes that
“[i]f most of fracking’s effects are local, the state should be in
the best position to balance costs and benefits, and ought to
build its regulatory capacity and regulatory infrastructure
accordingly.”501 He notes, however, that even within one state,
there are risks of over- and under-regulation: the costs and
benefits of the development will never occur within just one
political jurisdiction, and particularly where populous
jurisdictions do not bear the brunt of the costs, state politicians
may favor their voice over affected dissenters.502 Professor
Spence concludes that these problems can be addressed—
through compensation or the option of local vetoes, for
example503—and suggests that federal regulation be limited to
interstate effects of shale gas development.504 In contrast,
Professor Jody Freeman proposes a cooperative federalist
scheme with minimum performance standards, arguing that
“[t]he uneven approach is bad not only for the environment but
also for industry, because under the current system, mistakes
by a few bad apples could lead to overregulation or even

499. Cf. supra notes 40–49 (describing assertions by industry and other
entities that state regulation is effective).
500. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31 (showing
that New York has conducted an extensive risk analysis while placing a
temporary moratorium on development); COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, OIL &
GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, supra note 102 (showing comprehensive revisions to
Colorado’s oil and gas code).
501. Spence, supra note 496, at 43.
502. Id. at 44–45.
503. Id. at 46.
504. Id. at 54.

2013]

RISK AND RESPONSE

815

outright bans on drilling.” 505
Whether one favors a primary regime of federal, regional,
state, or local governance of shale gas development—or some
combination of those—in the short term it appears that states
will continue to bear the brunt of regulatory responsibility.
This Article leaves for future work a full analysis of where the
regulatory improvements need to occur. In the meantime,
however, states—the governments that currently have the
primary responsibility for mitigating risk—must act now.
CONCLUSION
A careful scientific analysis of fracturing will be necessary
to accurately identify, quantify, and rank the environmental
risks of oil and gas development from shales and tight sands,
and this Article does not purport to conduct this full analysis.
Indeed, with the information currently available, we can only
guess at the exact nature and magnitude of the risks, and the
preliminary nature of the reports and violations discussed here
cannot be overemphasized: even the Department of Energy—a
core repository of information about oil and gas development
and its risks—has noted that “uncertainties about impacts
need to be quantified and clarified” in the context of
fracturing.506
Despite these knowledge limitations, an initial
investigation of the existing literature and potential
environmental violations noted by states suggests several
important conclusions. The core areas of concern introduced by
new fracturing technologies appear to encompass issues that
policymakers and administrators have not yet adequately
considered or addressed, including more water withdrawals,
the use of new chemicals, and the production of new and more
wastes. The higher rate of oil and gas development enabled by
fracturing, in turn, expands many traditional risks tied to this
development, including surface spills of drilling fluids and
produced substances, improper storage and disposal of drilling
wastes, inadequate casing and cementing of wells, higher
505. Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/the-wise-way-to-regulatehydraulic-fracturing.html?_r=1&hp.
506. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMM. 90DAY REPORT 33 (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/
081811_90_day_report_final.pdf.
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emissions of air pollutants, and more land disturbances from
well pads and access roads, among other potential effects.
Instead of addressing these risks, however, much of the policy
debate so far has centered around one concern: that injection of
water and chemicals underground in the fracturing process
could contaminate groundwater.
This tendency toward tunnel vision is beginning to change,
at least in some areas. The New York Department of
Environmental Conservation has completed an extensive
analysis of the effects of shale gas development that uses large
quantities of water, although its assessment largely relies on
an existing and incomplete set of data.507 The Department of
Energy’s Shale Gas Production Subcommittee, in turn, has
published two reports emphasizing the need for a more
comprehensive consideration of risks and immediate policy
action in some areas.508 The Pennsylvania Governor’s
Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission has released a similar,
region-specific paper.509 Members of Congress, on the other
hand, have continued to call in state regulators to testify to the
lack of any groundwater contamination from fracturing and to
assert that no federal regulation of fracturing is needed—
arguing that states have the situation under control.510
In order to understand who should be regulating, and
whether and where more regulatory attention is needed, we
must know the true risks. Focusing on states’ past approaches
to oil and gas development, the lack of proven groundwater
contamination from fracturing, and rare yet alarming incidents
creates an unproductive stalemate while well development
continues to march forward at an astounding rate. The policy
dialogue and regulatory response, as currently framed, have
taken important steps toward identifying key risks but fail to
move us toward a much-needed comprehensive assessment of
the risks of this new boom. We must modify our approach in
favor of a careful discussion that moves beyond tired sound
bites, and this Article proposes a new, more productive
framework.
The issues raised here are by no means the only ones that
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31.
See SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., supra note 465; SEC’Y OF ENERGY
ADVISORY BD., supra note 499.
509. PA. GOVERNOR’S MARCELLUS SHALE ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT (July
22, 2011), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/MarcellusShaleAdvisory
Commission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/MSAC_Final_Report.pdf.
510. See supra notes 40–48.
507.
508.
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should be considered in this new dialogue. Indeed, some of the
risks suggested may prove to be low, while other, larger,
concerns may have been omitted. We cannot know this until we
frame the debate more broadly to consider and address risks
comprehensively and produce regulations that will both
generate new information on risks and address known risks.
Without this, America’s energy policy—already notoriously
haphazard and reactionary—will continue down a winding and
potentially damaging road.

